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Abstract
In this paper, we present a dynamic general equilibrium model to investigate
how di®erent contracting modes based on formal and relational enforcements en-
dogenously emerge and are dynamically linked with the process of economic devel-
opment. Formal contracts are enforced by third-party institutions (courts), while
relational contracts are self-enforcing agreements without any third-party involve-
ment. The novel feature of our model is that it demonstrates the co-evolution of
these di®erent enforcement modes and market equilibrium conditions, all of which
are jointly determined. We then characterize the equilibrium paths of such dynamic
processes and show the time structure of relational contracting in the endogenous
process of economic development. In particular, we show that relational contract-
ing fosters the emergence of a market-based economy in low-development stages
but its role declines as the economy grows and enters high-development stages.
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tract, relational contract
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1 Introduction
Informal contract arrangements, which we call relational contracting in this paper,
are common during the developing stages of economies. These arrangements are not
based on formally written contracts, but rather on long-term relationships, implicit
agreements, and a reputation mechanism via personal ties and connections, as typi-
cally observed in tribal and ancient societies1 as well as in emerging and transition
economies.2
Among other informal contract arrangements, one well-documented example is re-
lationship (insider) lending based on personal relationships between borrowers and
lenders, typically banks. Lamoreaux (1994) reported that during the early 19th cen-
tury, the New England banks lent a large portion of their funds to the board of direc-
tors and those who had close personal ties with these banks. Lamoreaux then found
evidence that such relationship lending contributed to the economic growth in New
England during that period.3 A related historical fact is that major German banks
such as Commerzbank, Dresdner, and Deutsche grew rapidly in the 19th century by
developing long-term relationships with industry enterprises by o®ering low interest
rates to them and being represented as board directors on these ¯rms. Such close and
lasting relationships between large banks and ¯rms contributed to the rapid expan-
sion of the German economy between the late 19th century and the First World War
(Allen (2001)). Maurer and Haber (2007) also provide related empirical evidence about
Mexican banks during similar periods (1880-1913): these bankers were engaged in re-
lationship lending by responding to information asymmetry and a large enforcement
cost but they did not loot their own banks.
These facts pose a positive view that relational contracting is not a substitute but
a complement to the market economy in that the former fosters the latter.4 On the
other hand, there is also a negative view on relational contracting that it plays a less
important role as the economy grows and reaches more developed stages. For example,
the New England banks that lent to closely-related persons (for example, directors
of these banks) in the early 19th century eventually had begun to lend to `outside'
borrowers, whom they did not personally know well, as the economy changed from
capital-poor to capital-rich, thus expanding the anonymous credit market in the late
1See Levi-Strauss (1969), Malinowski (1961), and Mauss (1967) for anthropological studies on recip-
rocal exchange and gift exchange in tribal societies. See Greif (2006) and Milgrom, North and Weingast
(1990) for a discussion on how the merchant trade system functioned as a reputation device in medieval
times.
2See McMillan and Woodru® (1999) for a discussion of trade credits in Vietnam and Johnson,
McMillan and Woodru® (2002) for a discussion of relational contracting in Russia.
3As Lamoreaux (1994) emphasized, insider lending was a phenomenon observed not only in New
England but also in other U.S. states during the early 19th century before the U.S. markets expanded.
4See Lamoreaux (1994), Allen (2001), and Maurer and Haber (2007) discussed above. For the
positive role of other informal institutions, see the papers contained in Aoki and Hayami (2000). For
example, Greif (2000) discusses the roles of the community trading system in pre-modern Europe and
Fafchamps (2000) provides evidence about business networks in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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19th century (Lamoreaux (1994)). A related argument is that the relationship-based
¯nancial system was dominant in Asian countries such as Korea and Japan after World
War II but it has been recently changing to the market-based ¯nancial system (see
Rajan and Zingales (2000)). DemirgÄu»c-Kunt and Levine (2004) provided the related
evidence that the ratio of bank ¯nance relative to equity ¯nance is negatively associated
with per capita GDP levels across countries, suggesting that bank ¯nance, which is often
characterized as a long-term lending relationship between a particular bank and a ¯rm,
becomes less important and is replaced by market-based ¯nance in developed countries.
The main objective of our paper is to provide a theoretical framework for under-
standing how and when relational contracting contributes to the process of economic
development. In particular, we characterize the time structures of relational contracting
(self-enforcing agreements) that change in the di®erent phases of economic development.
A novel feature of our model is to embed relational contracts that are supported by
long-term relationships into a dynamic general equilibrium model. Long-term relation-
ships have been mostly analysed in the partial equilibrium framework in the literature
of repeated games (see Mailath and Samulaeson (2006)): in a typical repeated game,
players play the stage games repeatedly over time by assuming that the outside markets
are exogenously given. However, despite much historical evidence that shows the im-
portant roles of long-term relationships in the process of economic development, there
are few theoretical studies that consider the macroeconomic implications of long-term
relationships. These are what we address in this paper. The important departure of
our paper from the literature of repeated games is that we investigate how long-term
relationships a®ect and are a®ected by the growth path of a macro-economy which is
endogenous as well.
In our model economy, producers who ¯nance their capital investment have the
incentive to default after they borrow the funds from lenders. We consider the two
means which prevent producers from defaulting. The ¯rst type is the competitive credit
market, in which everyone can borrow and lend at a given market interest rate in the
spot manner. However, when lenders lend their funds to the credit market, they must
incur some enforcement cost in order to write a formally enforceable contract which
prevents borrowers from defaulting. We call this type of contract an arm's length or
formal contract and call producers (respectively, lenders) who engage in an arm's length
contract A-producers (respectively, A-lenders). The enforcement cost incurred by A-
lenders includes costly activities such as collecting evidence about accounting data,
hiring lawyers and accounting professionals, and using the public enforcement agency
(courts).
The other way to protect lenders from default is to use implicit and informal con-
tracting arrangements. Speci¯cally, we suppose that there is a local community in our
model economy where each producer in the community has a personal connection with
a particular lender within the same community. The producer and the lender form
a long-term relationship over successive generations. We call this type of producer
and lender a R-producer and a R-lender, respectively. Each R-producer can engage in
relational contracting with a R-lender for ¯nancing capital investment without using
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the outside credit market. This type of contract is what we call a relational contract.
Because they interact with each other over time, each relationship pair of a R-producer
and a R-lender can avoid the strategic default problem via a self-enforcing agreement.
The advantage of relational contracts over arm's length contracts is the saving in
the enforcement cost which is inevitable under the latter while its disadvantage is that
relational contracts must be self-enforceable, that is, R-producers must be given the
incentive not to renege on the agreed upon repayment schedules.
As is well known from the repeated games literature, an implicit agreement is self-
enforceable if each party's deviation from honouring the agreement results in future
losses larger than the one-time gains obtained by the deviation. The novelty of our
model is how it relates the self-enforceability of relational contracting to the endoge-
nous process of economic development in a dynamic general equilibrium framework.
The pro¯t of an arm's length contract, which becomes the deviation payo® for each
R-producer when quitting the current relationship, is endogenously determined and
a®ects the self-enforcing condition of relational contract. In turn, the change in the
self-enforcing condition creates a feedback e®ect on the equilibrium determination of
the pro¯t of arm's length contract through changes in the market prices, such as wage
and interest rates. These two-way interactions between the self-enforcing condition of
relational contracts and the market equilibrium conditions jointly lead to the macroe-
conomic dynamics of the development process.
We then characterize the equilibrium paths of the model economy which involve the
dynamic transformation from a relationship-based system relying on relational con-
tracts to a market-based system relying on arm's length (formal) contracts. In any
equilibrium path, there exists a unique switching period before which the self-enforcing
constraint becomes less stringent so that each R-producer invests and produces more
than each A-producer, but after which it becomes more stringent so that each A-
producer invests and produces more than each R-producer. In particular, we show that
the output level of a R-producer relative to that of an A-producer, which we call the
relative output of the R-producer, declines over time from the initial period until it
hits some critical value. Thus, in the early stages of development, relational contract-
ing contributes more to the expansion of the economy than the arm's length contract,
while the former contributes less than the latter in the matured stages of development.
We also show that the economies which start with less reliance on relational contracting
switch more early from the relationship-based system to the market-based system than
those which start with more reliance on relational contracting.
The key behind these results is the dynamic general equilibrium interaction between
the self-enforcing condition of relational contracting and the determination of market
prices such as the interest and wage rates. Since relationship pairs of R-producers and
R-lenders do not incur the enforcement cost associated with capital investment, they
face a lower opportunity cost to raise capital for production than A-producers do. Thus,
R-producers can invest more in capital than A-producers do when the self-enforcing
condition becomes less stringent. In the early stages of development, the income level is
so low that the small saving limits the credit supply, and hence, the market interest rate
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becomes high, resulting in the low capital investment of A-producer. Then, the pro¯t
of an arm's length contract, which becomes the outside option for each R-producer who
quits a relationship, becomes lower so that the self-enforcing condition of a relational
contract becomes more likely to be sustained. This leads to a larger capital investment
of R-producers than A-producers. Since R-producers have lower opportunity cost to
raise capital than A-producers, the output expansion of the former relative to the
latter contributes to higher development of the economy as a whole. However, as the
market interest rates fall during the course of development, the self-enforcing condition
becomes more stringent so that R-producers eventually switch to invest less in capital
than A-producers do.
In such way we show that the economy exhibits the dynamic switching pattern
such that it relies more on relational contracting in the early stages of development
but it switches to rely more on arm's length contracts in the competitive market in the
later stages of development. This result is related to an argument made by Polanyi
(1947) that Western societies experienced the `great transformation' from nonmarket
systems to market-based systems when their economies expanded rapidly in the 19th
century. Moreover, R-producers contribute to economic development by producing
more in the early development stages in which the market economy is so immature that
A-producers produce less. Thus relational contracting plays a positive role in fostering
economic growth during low-development stages and in promoting the emergence of a
market-based economy. These results are consistent with the aforementioned historical
evidence that relational contracting complements the rise of a market-based economy
(Aoki and Hayami (2000) and Lamoreaux (1994)). In addition, our result also con¯rms
the historical fact that the relationship-based system declines as the economy grows and
expands more (see Lamoreaux (1994), Rajan and Zingales (2000) and DemirgÄu»c-Kunt
and Levine (2004) as we have already mentioned).
Related literature. Although several papers address relational contracting in partial
equilibrium frameworks, 5 few studies have attempted to examine its macroeconomic
implications via dynamic general equilibrium models. Some papers compare infor-
mal contracting enforcement, such as reputation, with formal and legal enforcement
in random matching environments. Kranton (1996) focuses on market-based monetary
exchange and relational (self-enforcing) contracts that emerge in a Kiyotaki-Wright-
type monetary search model. Dhilon and Rigolini (2006) compare reputation and legal
enforcement by endogenizing the quality of enforcement institutions. Francois (2011)
investigates the evolution of endogenous institutions, but his analysis focuses on the
roles of social norms formed through the change in endogenous preferences. Fran-
cois and Roberts (2003) examine how relational contracting a®ects long-run economic
growth in an R&D-based endogenous growth model. However, they do not focus on the
choice between arm's length and relational contracts. They also conduct a steady-state
5See, for example, Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002), Itoh and Morita (2007), Levin (2003),
MacLeod and Malcomson (1998), and Ramey and Watson (2003).
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analysis of the long-run growth rate and study the macroeconomic e®ects of produc-
tivity shocks on relational contracting between ¯rms and workers. Fafchamps (2003)
addresses the dynamic issue of how markets spontaneously emerge in a repeated game
setting.
Our paper is also related to the models of competitive economies with endoge-
nous debt constraints that prevent borrowers from defaulting (see, for example, Jeske
(2006), Kehoe and Levine (1993), and Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) for the models of
international borrowing and lending with default risk).
Our work here di®ers from all the research cited above because our main concern
is the dynamic change in the contracting modes and its relation to the process of
economic development which have been not addressed in the existing studies. Our
new insight is that both the sustainability of relational contracting and the evolution of
economic development are endogenous and jointly determined through dynamic general
equilibrium e®ects. Speci¯cally, we address the hitherto unaddressed issues of how and
when relationship-based economic systems change to market-based systems during the
endogenous process of economic development.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a partial
equilibrium model with a choice between arm's length and relational contracts by tak-
ing all the market prices as exogenously given. In Section 3, we turn to the full model
of a dynamic general equilibrium and de¯ne an equilibrium of the model economy. In
Section 4, we characterize the set of equilibrium paths and show that relational con-
tracting contributes more to economic growth in the early stages of development but
that its role becomes more limited as the economy enters the mature stages of devel-
opment. In Section 5, we discuss an extension of the model which allows endogenous
formation of relationship pairs. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix (with some
given in the Online Appendix).
2 Model: Partial Equilibrium
Before describing the full model of a dynamic general equilibrium, we will begin with
a partial equilibrium model by taking all the market prices as exogenously given. This
will be helpful for understanding the basic structure of relational contracting, which
will be combined in a general equilibrium model later.
2.1 Economic Environment
We consider an overlapping generations (OLG) economy with discrete time t = 0; 1; 2; :::.
Every period, a continuum of one unit mass of individuals is newly born; each indi-
vidual lives for two periods: young and old. In each generation, one young individual
is born from each old individual, and we use notation i to denote both individual i
and the dynasty to which individual i belongs. For simplicity, we assume that each
individual is concerned with only his or her consumption when old.
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The newly born individuals consist of lenders and producers (who become bor-
rowers). We use the masculine pronoun for producers and the feminine pronoun for
lenders. Each young lender born in period t is endowed with her income wt in terms of
the numµeraire good (which corresponds to the ¯nal good in the full model in Section
3). Because every young lender is concerned with her consumption level when old, she
will lend all the income wt to borrowers and consume all the saved income. In the full
model of a general equilibrium in Section 3, we will determine the income of young
lender wt in the labour market equilibrium.
In contrast, producer i can produce a speci¯c good i (which corresponds to inter-
mediate good i in the full model below) by investing in capital one period in advance.
Speci¯cally, a producer can produce one unit of his speci¯c good when old if he invests
in one unit of capital when young. We assume that capital fully depreciates after one
period and that young producers are not endowed with any income so that they need
to ¯nance their investments when young.
2.2 Preference
We assume that individual i (lender or producer) has an altruistic preference over the
consumption level of his or her child. 6 The reason why we introduce the altruistic
preference is to ensure that each individual has a reputational concern as we will see
in more detail below. If an individual reneges on an implicitly agreed upon contract,
his or her child may be punished by not having a better trading opportunity and
hence may consume less in the future period, which becomes a utility loss for the
deviating individual in the current period. Without an altruistic concern about the
child's consumption, any individual never honours implicit promises as will be apparent
in the following analysis.
More speci¯cally, we consider an individual in dynasty i who was born in period
t¡ 1 and whose consumption when old (in period t) is denoted by Ct¡1t (i) ¸ 0. Then,
we assume that the utility U t¡1(i) of an individual in dynasty i, born in period t¡ 1,
depends not only on his/her own consumption level when old in period t, Ct¡1t (i), but
also on the consumption level of his/her child in period t+ 1, Ctt+1(i), as follows:
U t¡1(i) ´ Ct¡1t (i) + ±Ctt+1(i); (1)
where ± 2 (0; 1) represents the parameter value measuring the degree to which each
individual is altruistic about his/her child. We will often call ± the discount factor when
6One might think why we use the framework of two-period-lived OLG model with altruistic prefer-
ence instead of using an in¯nitely-lived agent model. The main reason for this is to simplify the saving
decision of each individual which makes the credit market equilibrium condition easier to be handled.
In an in¯nitely-lived agent model, we need to keep track of the Euler equation of saving decision as
an additional dynamic equation which would make the dynamic analysis of self-enforcing agreement
more complicated. Our OLG model of a two-period-lived agent with altruistic preference can avoid
such complication while allowing us to incorporate a self-enforcing agreement into a dynamic general
equilibrium in a simpler way.
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no confusion arises because it plays a similar role to the discount factor in repeated
games.
To keep the model simple, we assume that there is no bequest transfer across gen-
erations in each dynasty. Then, each individual consumes all of his/her old income for
himself/herself such that Ct¡1t (i) is equal to the lifetime income level of individual i
born in period t¡ 1. We will discuss an extension of the basic model to allow bequests
in the Conclusion (see the Online Appendix).
2.3 Strategic Default and Contracting Modes
Each producer wants to ¯nance his capital investment for future production from
lenders but there exists a strategic default problem such that any producer can run
away and deny any repayment after he borrows from a lender. Anticipating such a
strategic default, the lenders never lend to the producers.
In this paper, we consider two alternative means to alleviate this problem.
Arm's Length Contract. In the economy, there is a competitive credit market
where borrowing and lending are made at a given interest rate. The credit market is
competitive in the sense that everyone takes the market interest rate rt ¸ 0 as given
in any period t. 7 However, the credit market is not perfectly competitive in the sense
that it involves the strategic default problem we have assumed above. This can be
avoided in the credit market as follows.
In the credit market, each young lender must spend 1¡¸ units of the numµeraire good
(0 < ¸ < 1) for lending one unit to a borrower and preventing him from committing
strategic default. Here, 1¡¸ is called the enforcement cost per unit lending in the credit
market. For example, 1 ¡ ¸ includes the costs of making the information disclosure
credible, collecting hard evidence, hiring professionals such as lawyers and accountants
who help write formal contracts, and using outside institutions such as courts. 8 Then,
when a young lender lends wt to the credit market in period t, she needs to spend
(1 ¡ ¸)wt for contract enforcement and will thus earn the interest income rt+1¸wt in
the next period t+ 1 by lending the remaining amount of ¸wt.
As long as lenders incur the enforcement cost, the credit market works as the
standard competitive market where lenders and borrowers trade at a given market
interest rate rt in the anonymous and spot fashion. We call such a transaction made
in the anonymous credit market an arm's length contract. We also call a producer
7Here, rt denotes the gross interest rate for a spot transaction in the credit market, which speci¯es
that one unit of borrowing in period t¡ 1 must result in the repayment of rt units in the next period
t. Thus, by the nature of spot transactions in the credit market, no borrower can roll a debt obligation
forward in period t¡ 1 to his child who would repay it in period t+ 1.
8We can also allow borrowers to incur some costs preventing themselves from committing strategic
default. For example, each borrower makes some investment in the enforcement technology such that he
can commit himself not to default. Since such a possibility cannot alter the main results substantially,
we will not pursue such a case in what follows.
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(borrower) and a lender who are engaged in the arm's length contract in the credit
market, an A-producer and an A-lender, respectively.
We let xt ¸ 0 denote the capital investment (equivalently, the production level) of
an A-producer. We also let pt ¸ 0 denote the price for a speci¯c good an A-producer
produces. Then, the pro¯t of an old A-producer in period t is given by ¼t ´ ptxt¡rtxt.
In this section, we take the capital investment choice of A-producers and their pro¯t
¼t as exogenously ¯xed; these will be endogenously determined in the next section.
Relational Contract. Relational contracting becomes an alternative to avoid the
strategic default problem as follows. In the economy, there is a local community where
l (l < 1) producers and l lenders reside. Thus, 1 ¡ l producers and 1 ¡ l lenders are
outside the local community and engage in arm's length contracts in the credit market.
The producers and lenders in the community are matched with each other in the initial
period t = 0 in a one-to-one manner. Then, each of the matched l pairs forms a
personal connection and relationship. We assume that such relationships formed in the
initial period can be inherited over successive generations. We call a producer in the
community a R-producer and a lender in the community a R-lender respectively.
In the basic model, we will focus on the case that the number of relationship pairs in
the local community does not increase from its initial value l 2 (0; 1) by assuming that
nobody can enter the local community in order to seek a relationship partner. Further,
as we will see below, all R-producers and R-lenders never quit their relationships in
equilibrium, ensuring that the number of relationship pairs is never decreased from its
initial value l 2 (0; 1) as well. Then, the number of relationship pairs becomes constant
at l 2 (0; 1) over time. The fact that the membership of those who engage in relational
contracting is constant is observed in several places where relational contracting is based
on closed community memberships. 9 In Section 5, we will drop this assumption and
turn to the case where the number of relationship pairs evolves over time because the
producers and lenders freely enter the matching market to seek relationship partners.
Any R-producer and R-lender in each pair can always exercise the option to quit
their relationship (called the quitting option) at any time by leaving the community.
We will then assume that if a R-producer (respectively, a R-lender) quits the relation-
ship, his (respectively, her) child cannot also form a relationship with the child of his
(respectively, her) partner in the next period. In such a case, not only the current
R-producer and R-lender but also their children have no choice but to engage in an
arm's length contract in the anonymous credit market. 10
In what follows, we let zt ¸ 0 denote the capital investment (equivalently, the
production level) of a R-producer. Each young R-producer, born in period t ¡ 1, can
9For example, see Fafchamps (2000) for the case of the business community in Zimbabwe.
10However, we do not assume permanent dissolution here; that is, we do not assume that once a R-
producer and an R-lender dissolve their relationship, all their descendants cannot re-form the previous
relationships forever. We only assume that it takes at least one period for a dissolved relationship to be
re-formed. We later show that the assumption of one-period dissolution of a relationship is su±cient
for each relationship pair to honour the agreed upon relational contracts over time.
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directly ¯nance his investment zt from his partner, a young R-lender, in exchange for
making repayment Rt in period t. Since the repayment Rt is not secured due to the
strategic default of the R-producer, such an agreement, fzt; Rtg, must be implicit and
self-enforceable. We call this type of contract a relational contract.
2.4 Timing within Each Period
Events in each period proceed in the local community as follows (see Figure 1 for the
time line). First, at the beginning of each period, the old R-producer and R-lender
of each relationship pair decide whether to exercise the quitting option. When they
exercise the quitting option, their relationship is dissolved and their children will have
no choice but to engage in an arm's length contract in the next period. When an old R-
producer and an old R-lender in a relationship do not exercise the quitting option, in the
same period, their children (the young R-producer and R-lender) simultaneously decide
whether to exercise the quitting option. When they do not exercise the quitting option,
they agree on a relational contract, fzt; Rtg, which speci¯es the capital investment level
zt and the repayment Rt to the R-lender. Because the producer cannot commit himself
to repay Rt, such a relational contract must be self-enforceable.
By exercising the quitting option, the young R-producer and R-lender obtain their
outside payo®s: any young R-producer who quits a relationship in period t¡ 1 obtains
the outside pro¯t ¼t while any young R-lender who quits a relationship in period t¡ 1
lends her endowment wt¡1 to the outside credit market and earns the interest income
¸rtwt¡1. For the time being, we will treat the outside pro¯t ¼t of a producer and the
market interest rate rt to be exogenous, although we will endogenize these variables in
the next section.
2.5 Initial Period (t = 0)
In the initial period (t = 0), each old producer (irrespective of an A-producer or a
R-producer) owns an initial capital stock, x0, which is assumed to be historically given.
11 Because the old producers in the initial period do not need to raise funds for capital
investment, they can produce the goods of x0 without any production costs. There is
also one unit mass of old lenders in the initial period.
2.6 Relational Contracts: Self-Enforcing Conditions
Consider any dynasty of relationships that consist of R-producers and R-lenders in the
successive generations who implicitly agree to enforce a sequence of relational contracts
fzt; Rtg1t=0 from the initial period t = 0 onward. Here, a contract fzt+1; Rt+1g is
designed for t-th generation of the dynasty born in period t. Then we will consider the
11We here assume that all old producers in the initial period own the same amount of initial capital
stock, z0 = x0, for simplifying the analysis. Our results do not substantially change even when we
allow z0 6= x0.
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conditions under which such sequence of relational contracts is self-enforceable by all
the generations of the dynasty.
There are three constraints to be satis¯ed for a relational contract fzt; Rtg to be self-
enforceable. The ¯rst constraint is the incentive compatibility (IC) condition, according
to which the old R-producer has no incentive to renege on the agreed upon repayment
Rt. The second constraint is the individual rationality condition for R-producer (IRP),
according to which the young R-producer is weakly better o® by agreeing to a relational
contract instead of exercising the quitting option. The third constraint is the individual
rationality condition for R-lender (IRL), according to which the young R-lender is
weakly better o® agreeing to a relational contract instead of exercising the quitting
option.
Incentive Compatibility (IC). Under a relational contract fzt; Rtg, the young R-
producer promises to repay Rt to the R-lender matching him when old (in period t)
in exchange for borrowing zt directly from her. For the time being, we suppose that
wt¡1 ¸ zt; this will be shown to be true in any equilibrium (see Lemma 2 below). After
the generation in period t¡ 1 follows the relational contract, the next generation born
in period t will also agree to a relational contract fRt+1; zt+1g and enforce it where the
R-producer (who is the child of the old R-producer in period t) does not exercise the
quitting option but honours the contracted agreement Rt+1 when old in period t+ 1.
Anticipating the outcome in period t + 1 described above, the old R-producer in
period t makes the repayment Rt to the old R-lender and does not exercise the quitting
option only if the following IC constraint, (ICt), is satis¯ed:
ptzt ¡Rt + ±fpt+1zt+1 ¡Rt+1g ¸ ptzt + ±¼t+1; (ICt)
where pt+1 > 0 denotes the price of a speci¯c good an old R-producer produces in
period t+ 1.
We now explain ICt in detail. The right-hand side of ICt denotes the payo® the
old R-producer could obtain if he reneged on repayment Rt and exercised the quitting
option. By doing so, he can save on repayment Rt and capture the whole revenue ptzt
from capital investment zt, but in the next period, t+1, his child faces the dissolution
of the relationship with the child of the current lender. In such a case, the child of such
a deviating producer would obtain his outside pro¯t ¼t+1. This child's future payo®
is evaluated using the altruistic parameter ± > 0 from the viewpoint of the current
producer. Thus, the sum of these payo®s can be guaranteed by the old R-producer
when he reneges on the repayment Rt. In contrast, the left-hand side of ICt denotes
the payo® of the old R-producer when he makes contracted repayment Rt to the R-
lender matching him in period t expecting that the relationship is inherited by the next
generation, in which case his child also makes repayment Rt+1 in period t + 1. This
future payo® is also evaluated using ± from the viewpoint of the current old producer
in period t. Thus, ICt is necessary for the old R-producer not to renege on repayment
Rt in period t.
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Individual Rationality (IR). In addition to the above, the following individual ra-
tionality constraint, IRLt, of each young R-lender must be satis¯ed: 12
Rt + ¸rt(wt¡1 ¡ zt) + ±fRt+1 + ¸rt+1(wt ¡ zt+1)g ¸ ¸rtwt¡1 + ±¸rt+1wt: (IRLt)
Otherwise, the young R-lender would exercise the quitting option in period t ¡ 1; by
exercising the quitting option, the lender and her child lend their entire wage income to
the credit market so as to earn the interest income corresponding to the payo®s on the
right-hand side of IRLt. Here, (1¡¸)wt must be spent for the enforcement cost of arm's
length contract. Further, the interest income of her child, ¸rt+1wt, is evaluated by the
altruistic parameter ± from the viewpoint of the current old lender. However, if the
R-lender does not exercise the quitting option, she would obtain contracted repayment
Rt in period t, which appears as the ¯rst term on the left-hand side of IRLt, in addition
to interest income ¸rt(wt¡1 ¡ zt) from the saving on the remaining income wt¡1 ¡ zt
after lending zt to the R-producer. (Note here that we are assuming that wt¡1 ¸ zt.)
Here, (1¡¸)(wt¡1¡zt) must be spent for the enforcement cost of arm's length contract
in the credit market. The child of the lender is then paid the contracted amount Rt+1
in addition to the interest income ¸rt+1(wt ¡ zt+1) when old in period t+ 1. Here, the
payo® of the lender's child is evaluated by the altruistic parameter ± > 0 again from
the viewpoint of the current old lender.
Combining ICt with IRLt, we derive the following modi¯ed IC condition, denoted
by IC¤t :
±fpt+1zt+1 ¡ ¸rt+1zt+1 ¡ ¼t+1g ¸ ¸rtzt: (IC¤t )
This condition is necessary for a relational contract to be self-enforceable.
Next, we consider the individual rationality constraint of each young R-producer
(IRPt):
ptzt ¡Rt + ±fpt+1zt+1 ¡Rt+1g ¸ ¼t + ±¼t+1: (IRPt)
The condition IRPt ensures that each young R-producer prefers continuing the rela-
tionship to dissolving it. Suppose that some young R-producer exercises the quitting
option when young. Then, he earns the outside pro¯t ¼t and his child earns the outside
pro¯t ¼t+1. The latter is evaluated by ± from the viewpoint of the current producer.
The sum of these payo®s corresponds to the payo® each A-producer obtains via an
arm's length contract, which thus becomes his outside option. However, the left-hand
side of IRPt denotes the payo® of the young R-producer who does not exercise the
quitting option when young; by doing so, he earns ptzt ¡ Rt when old (period t) by
making repayment Rt to the relationship lender. Following this, his child also continues
the relationship and earns pro¯t pt+1zt+1 ¡Rt+1 by making the contracted repayment
12As long as IRLt is satis¯ed, any old R-lender has no incentive to renege on the repayment Rt as
well when Rt < 0. This follows from the following fact: since the right-hand side of IRLt is larger than
¸rt(wt¡1¡zt)+±¸rt+1wt, IRLt implies that Rt+±fR+1+¸rt+1(wt¡zt+1)g ¸ ±¸rt+1wt, which means
that every old R-lender wants to make the repayment Rt < 0 and continue a relationship to the next
generation rather than quitting the relationship, provided she has already lent zt to the R-producer
from her income wt¡1 when young.
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Rt+1 to the R-lender when old (period t+1). Thus, the young R-producer obtains the
sum of these payo®s by continuing the relationship.
By subtracting the right-hand sides of IRPt and IRLt from their left-hand sides,
the net total surplus of a relationship pair of a young R-producer and a young R-lender
born in period t¡ 1 is de¯ned as
TSt ´ ptzt ¡ ¸rtzt ¡ ¼t + ±fpt+1zt+1 ¡ ¸rt+1zt+1 ¡ ¼t+1g
for t ¸ 1.
Here, we assume that the inverse demand function for a speci¯c good is given by
pt = ®A´®¡1t for ´t = zt or ´ = xt, where A > 0 and ® 2 (0; 1) are the parameters,
which we will derive by using monopolistic competition in the general equilibrium model
in Section 3. Then, we can de¯ne the net gain from relational contracting in period t
as
ptzt ¡ ¸rtzt ¡ ¼t = ®A(z®t ¡ x®t ) + rt(xt ¡ ¸zt):
This net gain increases when the interest rate rt goes up, provided the R-producer's
investment, zt, is less than (1=¸)xt, which will actually be the case in equilibrium (see
Lemma 3 below). This is because a rise in the interest rate reduces the pro¯t of an
arm's length contract ¼t more than the increase in the opportunity cost of relational
contracting ¸rtzt when the R-producer's investment is less than (1=¸)xt. We will see
later that the increase in the interest rate makes relational contract easier to be satis¯ed
so that it becomes more sustainable in the low developed stages in which the interest
rates are high. We will then endogenize the interest rate and show how the endogenous
change in the interest rate plays an important role for determining the self-enforcing
condition of relational contracting, and as a result, the dynamic process of the economy.
In the initial period t = 0, each initial old R-producer earns the pro¯t ¼0 ´ ®Ax®0
because he owns the initial capital x0 while each initial old R-lender earns nothing.
Thus, their joint pro¯t is ¼0. Since each initial old R-producer also has the outside
option to earn ¼0, the net total surplus TS0 in the initial period t = 0 becomes TS0 ´
±f®Az®1 ¡ ¸r1z1 ¡ ¼1g. 13
Then, for a relationship pair of a young R-producer and a young R-lender born in
period t ¡ 1 to agree on a relational contract fzt; Rtg, it must satisfy both IRPt and
IRLt; that is, the total net surplus of each relationship pair must be non-negative:
TSt ¸ 0; for any t ¸ 0 (TSt):
We can then readily show that there exists a sequence of repayments fRtg1t=1 that
satisfy ICt, IRLt¡1, and IRPt¡1 for all t ¸ 1 as long as IC¤t and TSt¡1 are satis¯ed for
all t ¸ 1.14
Finally, we denote by
Jt ´ ptzt + ¸rt(wt¡1 ¡ zt)
13Here, we have IRP0: ¼0 ¡R0 + ±fp1z1 ¡R1g ¸ ¼0 + ±¼1, and IRL0: R0 + ±fR1 + ¸r1(w0 ¡ z1)g ¸
±¸r1w0.
14It is su±cient to set Rt = ¸rtzt for each t ¸ 1 and R0 such that ¼0 ¸ R0 ¸ 0.
13
and
Vt ´ Jt + ±Jt+1
the joint pro¯t and the joint payo® of a relationship pair born in period t¡ 1, respec-
tively.
Although there are many possible equilibria sustained by di®erent relational con-
tracts as known in the Folk Theorem of repeated game theory, we will focus on the
equilibrium called the best relational contracting equilibrium (BRCE), in which the ini-
tial generation of relationship pairs in each dynasty chooses a sequence of all future
relational contracts fzt; Rtg1t=1 so as to maximize the weighted sum of joint payo®s
of all generations in the same dynasty
P1
t=0 ¯
tVt for some weight ¯ 2 (0; 1), subject
to the above constraints f(IC¤t ); (TSt¡1)g1t=1, given the future paths of all the market
prices frt; wtg1t=0. 15 16 17 Thus, the initial generation in each dynasty puts the
welfare weight ¯t on the t-th generation of the same dynasty when solving the opti-
mal relational contracts. Then, since
P1
t=0 ¯
tVt = J0 + (± + ¯)
P1
t=1 ¯
t¡1Jt and since
J0 = ¼0 is exogenously given, the above optimization problem is equivalent to maxi-
mizing
P1
t=1 ¯
t¡1Jt subject to IC¤t and TSt¡1 for all t ¸ 1. The results we establish in
what follows do not depend on the particular values of the welfare weight ¯ 2 (0; 1).18
Then, we can show the following result on the optimal relational contracts.
Lemma 1. (i) Each relationship pair born in period t¡1 agrees to a relational contract
fzt; Rtg and follows it if and only if IC¤s and TSs are satis¯ed for all s ¸ t. (ii) In
the optimal relational contract, zt · ^¸xt holds in any period t where ^¸ ´ ¸1=(®¡1) > 1,
and ^¸xt maximizes the joint pro¯t Jt. (iii) The optimal relational contract involves a
downward distortion of capital investment zt < ^¸xt as compared to the investment level
maximizing the joint pro¯t Jt only if IC¤t is binding.
Lemma 1 (i) implies that a sequence of relational contracts fzt; Rtg1t=1 is self-
enforceable if and only if IC¤t and TSt¡1 are satis¯ed for all t ¸ 1. Among all relational
contracts that satisfy this requirement, the initial generation of relationship pairs in
each dynasty chooses the relational contracts that maximize the weighted sum of the
15See Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008) for a related treatment of self-enforcing agreements
in a dynamic general equilibrium model, although they consider a di®erent model from ours.
16In addition, we need to impose the condition ptzt ¸ Rt ¸ ¡¸rt(wt¡1 ¡ zt) for all t ¸ 1 and
¼0 ¸ R0 ¸ 0. This ensures that the consumption levels of each old R-producer and each old R-lender
are non-negative in each period; this is called condition NNCt. However, we can solve the optimal
relational contracts without NNCt, and then, can check that the optimal relational contract satis¯es
NNCt later by adjusting the repayment Rt appropriately and using the other conditions such as IC
¤
t
and TSt. Also, IC
¤
t and TS0 imply that ptzt + ¸rt(wt¡1 ¡ zt) ¸ ¸rtwt¡1 + ¼t for all t which then
ensures that every relationship cannot gain from engaging in arm's length contract in the credit market
in each period t on the equilibrium path in which ICt and TS0 are satis¯ed for all t ¸ 1.
17This formulation is equivalent to maximizing the sum of R-producers' payo®s in each dynasty
subject to ICt, IRPt¡1, and IRLt¡1 for all t ¸ 1: maxfRt;ztg
P1
t=0 ¯
tfptzt¡Rtg subject to ICt, IRPt¡1
and IRLt¡1 for t = 1; 2; :::.
18If one might think that it is reasonable to suppose that the initial generation has the same welfare
weight as his or her altruistic preference parameter ±, we can set ¯ = ±.
14
joint pro¯ts of all generations in the same dynasty
P1
t=1 ¯
t¡1Jt. Lemmas 1 (ii) and
(iii) then show that the optimal relational contract involves a lower capital investment
than the one maximizing the joint pro¯t Jt without IC¤t ; that is, zt < ^¸xt. This occurs
only if IC¤t is binding.
One of the key variables which a®ect the optimal relational contract is the interest
rate rt in the anonymous credit market. As we have already mentioned, high interest
rates make relational contract easier to be self-enforceable so that R-producers invest
more than A-producers do when zt · (1=¸)xt holds, which will be shown to be true in
any equilibrium below. This implies that relational contract becomes less constrained
in the early stages of development in which the anonymous credit market is immature so
that the interest rates are high but it becomes more constrained in the well-developed
stages with low interest rates. In the next section, we will address this issue by turning
to the full model of a dynamic general equilibrium in which all the market prices
such as fwt; rtg1t=0 are endogenously determined together with the optimal relational
contract we have shown above. The novel part of our model is that we investigate how
these market prices a®ect and are a®ected by the self-enforcing conditions of relational
contracts, resulting in the dynamic process of the whole economy.
3 Model: General Equilibrium
In this section we provide a dynamic general equilibrium model which is kept as simple
as possible in order to incorporate the market equilibrium conditions into the partial
equilibrium model presented in the previous section. To this end, we need at least
three things: (i) the income level each lender earns wt is endogenously determined,
(ii) the interest rate rt is endogenously determined, and (iii) the price of each speci¯c
good pt is endogenous and some positive pro¯t for the production of that good can be
guaranteed because otherwise the total surplus of relational contract cannot be positive
and hence relational contract will never become sustainable. The ¯rst and second parts
are addressed by introducing the credit and labour market clearing conditions. The last
part is addressed by considering a monopolistic competition for speci¯c goods (modelled
as intermediate goods below) which ensures a positive pro¯t for each producer who
obtains monopolistic power over a di®erentiated good he produces.
3.1 Markets
In the economy, there is a single ¯nal good, taken as a numµeraire, which is used for
both consumption and investment. The ¯nal good Yt is produced by a continuum of
intermediate goods, each of which is indexed by i 2 [0; 1], and labour Lt in the following
manner:
Yt = AL1¡®t
Z 1
0
´t(i)®di; (2)
where ® 2 (0; 1), A > 0, and ´t(i) denotes the input demand for intermediate good i
in period t (which is equivalent to its output).
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Each intermediate good i is produced by producer i, either an A-producer or a
R-producer, who possesses the speci¯c knowledge to produce that intermediate good.
The speci¯c good we have considered in the partial equilibrium model in Section 2 is
interpreted as an intermediate good in the general equilibrium model in this section.
Here, as we have assumed in the partial equilibrium model, producer i (an A-producer
or a R-producer) can produce one unit of intermediate good i when old by investing
one unit of capital when young.
We also assume that each young lender, born in each period t, is endowed with
one unit of labour and inelastically supplies it to the labour market in order to earn
the wage income wt. The labour supplied by these young lenders (workers) is used for
producing the ¯nal good of the economy.
We assume that there is perfect competition in the ¯nal good market. Then, the
¯nal good ¯rm chooses the demand for labour Lt and intermediate inputs ´t(i) to
maximize its pro¯t:
AL1¡®t
Z 1
0
´t(i)®di¡ wtLt ¡
Z 1
0
pt(i)´t(i)di; (3)
where the wage rate wt and price of intermediate good i, pt(i), are taken as given. The
corresponding ¯rst-order conditions are as follows:
A®L1¡®t ´t(i)
®¡1 = pt(i) (4)
and
A(1¡ ®)L¡®t
Z 1
0
´t(i)®di = wt: (5)
Equation (4) corresponds to the inverse demand function for a speci¯c good we have
used in the partial equilibrium model in the previous section.
We also assume that the labour market is perfectly competitive and we let wt ¸ 0
denote the competitive market wage in period t in the labour market.
Finally, as we have explained in the previous section, there exists the credit market
where a producer and a lender can enter into a formal credit contract, which we call
the arm's length contract, in the spot manner. However, here, the lender must incur
the enforcement cost to prevent the borrower from defaulting: each lender must spend
1¡ ¸ 2 (0; 1) unit of the ¯nal good as the enforcement cost for lending one unit to the
credit market.
3.2 Arm's Length Contract Producers
Because every A-producer faces the same demand function, (4), for his intermediate
good, we will omit notation i hereafter.
We then obtain ¼t, the pro¯t of an intermediate good producer (an A-producer)
who ¯nances his investment xt via an arm's length contract in period t, as follows:
¼t ´ ptxt ¡ rtxt
= AL1¡®t ®x
®
t ¡ rtxt; (6)
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where the price of an intermediate good, pt, is given by (4) and ´t(i) = xt for each
A-producer i. Because Lt = 1 holds in the labour market equilibrium, we set Lt = 1
in what follows.
Each young A-producer born in period t ¡ 1 chooses the capital investment level
xt to maximize his payo® ¼t + ±¼t+1. Here, note that his consumption level Ct¡1t is
equal to the pro¯t ¼t he earned in period t, whereas the consumption level of his child
is Ctt+1 = ¼t+1. Thus, the payo® of a young A-producer is given by C
t¡1
t + ±C
t
t+1 =
¼t+±¼t+1. Since each A-producer takes the market prices such as wt and rt as given and
his capital investment xt a®ects only his own pro¯t ¼t, we will focus on the equilibrium
in which a young A-producer chooses his capital investment xt so as to maximize only
his own pro¯t ¼t.19
We then de¯ne such optimal investment by xt = x(rt) as a function of the interest
rate rt, which satis¯es the following ¯rst-order condition:
A®2x®¡1t = rt: (7)
Thus, we have
max
xt
¼t = A®(1¡ ®)x®t (8)
where xt satis¯es (7). In what follows, we will often omit the argument rt from x(rt)
and simply write xt for xt = x(rt) when no confusion arises.
3.3 De¯nition of Equilibrium Paths
Now, we provide a formal de¯nition of an equilibrium path in this model economy.
De¯nition. A sequence fxt; zt; wt; rtg1t=0 is said to be an equilibrium path of the econ-
omy if the following conditions are satis¯ed.
(i) Each young A-producer born in period t¡ 1 chooses his capital investment xt so
as to maximize his own pro¯t ¼t, which satis¯es the optimality condition (7).
(ii) The initial generation of the relationship pairs in each dynasty chooses a se-
quence of future relational contracts fzt; Rtg1t=1 so as to maximize the weighted
sum of the joint payo®s of all generations in the same dynasty
P1
t=0 ¯
tVt subject
to f(IC¤t ); (TSt¡1)g1t=1.
(iii) The labour market equilibrium (LMEt): Setting Lt = 1 in (5) determines the
market wage wt as
wt = A(1¡ ®)(lz®t + (1¡ l)x®t ):
19However, in general, there may exist strategic interactions between successive generations in the
same dynasty of A-producers in that they may make the current capital investment choices contingent
on the observed history about the capital investments chosen in the past periods in the same dynasty.
However, we can show that no generality is lost by con¯ning our attention to the equilibrium in which
each A-producer chooses xt in order to maximize only his own pro¯t ¼t in any period t no matter what
histories are observed up to period t (see the Online Appendix).
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(iv) The credit market equilibrium (CMEt¡1):
¸wt¡1 = ¸lzt + (1¡ l)xt:
Here, the initial capital z0 = x0 is given.
Condition (i) yields the optimal capital choice of each young A-producer taking
market prices wt and rt as given. Condition (ii) is the optimal choice with regard to
relational contract fzt; Rtg for every relationship pair, as we have explained in Section
2. Condition (iii) gives LMEt which is the labour market clearing condition: market
wage wt is determined by clearing the labour market (Lt = 1) using the labour demand
function (5) with the labour supply equal to one unit mass of young workers in every
period. Condition (iv) gives CMEt¡1 which is the credit market clearing condition
in period t ¡ 1. Each young R-producer lends ¸(wt¡1 ¡ zt) to the anonymous credit
market in period t¡1 after she makes a relationship lending zt to the young R-producer
matching her. Here, note that we are supposing wt¡1 ¸ zt and that each R-lender
must spend (1 ¡ ¸)(wt¡1 ¡ zt) for the enforcement cost of the arm's length contract.
In addition to this supply of credit, 1¡ l young A-lenders outside the community have
nothing but to lend ¸wt¡1 each to the credit market. Thus, the total credit supply in
the anonymous credit market is given by l¸(wt¡1¡ zt)+ (1¡ l)¸wt¡1. Conversely, 1¡ l
young A-producers ¯nance their capital investment xt each from the credit market.
Thus, the total demand in the credit market is given by (1 ¡ l)xt. Then, the credit
market of period t¡ 1 clears if CMEt¡1 holds.
In this model economy, the initial condition is given by initial capital stock z0 = x0
owned by each initial old intermediate good producer irrespective of a R-producer or
an A-producer. Thus, every initial old intermediate good producer produces z0 = x0
without any production costs. Then, the market wage in the initial period (t = 0) is
determined by the labour market equilibrium LME0: w0 = A(1¡ ®)x®0 .
4 Characterization of Equilibrium Dynamics: From Rela-
tionships to Markets
In this section, we show that relational contracting contributes to economic growth
in low-development stages while its value declines as the economy grows and enters
high-development stages.
4.1 Preliminary Results
We begin by showing the preliminary results that will be useful for characterizing the
equilibrium paths.
First, we have thus far assumed that each R-producer does not invest in capital
more than the funds available to the R-lender matching him, i.e., wt¡1 ¸ zt, in any
equilibrium. Now we show that this is actually the case in any equilibrium. If this is
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not the case in some period t, we have zt > wt¡1 and hence each R-producer needs to
¯nance the remaining amount zt ¡ wt¡1 from the credit market after borrowing wt¡1
directly from the R-lender matching him. Then, the joint pro¯t of the relationship
pair is changed to Jt = ptzt ¡ rt(zt ¡ wt¡1) which is decreasing in the interest rate rt.
If each R-producer demands high capital investment zt > wt¡1 in the credit market,
the equilibrium interest rate rt must go up in order to clear the credit market. This
however reduces the joint pro¯t Jt and lowers the capital investment of the R-producer
zt until it restores the condition wt¡1 ¸ zt in the credit market equilibrium. We thus
obtain the following.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium path zt · wt¡1 must hold in any period t.
Second, we show that IC¤t is always binding in any equilibrium path.
Lemma 3. In any equilibrium, zt · (1=¸)xt holds in any period t. Then, the IC
condition IC¤t becomes binding in any period t in any equilibrium.
Recall that the net gain from relational contracting in period t is de¯ned as ®A(z®t ¡
x®t )+rt(xt¡¸zt) which is decreasing in rt when zt > (1=¸)xt. If each R-producer invests
more than (1=¸)xt (i.e., zt > (1=¸)xt) in some period t, the interest rate must go up
in order to meet such high capital investment demand in the credit market equilibrium
(CMEt¡1). This in turn reduces the net gain from a relational contract, lowering the
capital investment of the R-producer so that as a consequence zt · (1=¸)xt is re-
stored. When zt · (1=¸)xt holds, we have that zt < ^¸xt so that (IC¤t ) must be binding
in equilibrium due to Lemma 1.
4.2 Rise and Fall of Relational Contracts
Next, we characterize equilibrium paths. In particular, we investigate how relationship
lending contributes to the process of economic development relative to market lending
based on arm's length contracts. Then, we show that each R-producer who enters into
relational contract invests and hence produces more than each A-producer who enters
into arm's length contract in the early stages of development, but the former invests
less than the latter in later development stages.
Thanks to Lemma 2 and 3, any equilibrium path of the economy can be described
as a sequence fzt; xt; rt; wtg1t=0 which satis¯es binding IC¤t and CMEt:
±f®Az®t+1 ¡ ¸rt+1zt+1 ¡ ¼t+1g = ¸rtzt; t = 1; 2; :::; (IC¤t )
¸wt = ¸lzt+1 + (1¡ l)xt+1; t = 1; 2; :::; (CMEt)
where rt = ®2Ax®¡1t (see (7)), wt = A(1¡ ®)(lz®t + (1¡ l)x®t ) (see LMEt), and
¸w0 = ¸lz1 + (1¡ l)x1 (CME0)
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for a given initial market wage w0 = (1¡ ®)Ax®0 .
By substituting rt = ®2Ax®¡1t into IC¤t , using ¼t = A®(1¡®)x®t (see (8)), and de¯n-
ing a new variable yt ´ zt=xt for the relative output of a R-producer which measures
the ratio between capital investments (output) of relational and arm's length contracts,
we can re-write the above equilibrium conditions as follows:µ
xt+1
xt
¶®
±fy®t+1 ¡ ¸®yt+1 ¡ (1¡ ®)g = ¸®yt; t = 1; 2; :::; (9)
¸(1¡ ®)Ax®t (ly®t + (1¡ l)) = xt+1(¸lyt+1 + (1¡ l)); t = 1; 2; :::; (10)
and
¸w0 = x1(¸ly1 + (1¡ l)): (11)
Note that yt · ¸¡1 holds in any period t due to Lemma 3.
Since w0 is exogenously given, the above equations (9) and (10) fully determine an
equilibrium path fxt; ytg1t=1 once we ¯x the value of (x1; y1) in the ¯rst period t = 1.
The ¯rst period values of (x1; y1) can be freely chosen as long as they satisfy the initial
condition (11). Thus, there are multiple equilibrium paths even though the initial
condition x0 and hence w0 are exogenously ¯xed.
We ¯rst show that the relative output of R-producer yt declines over time until
it hits some critical value and that there exists a switching period T before which
yt > 1 holds but after which yt < 1 holds. Such a switching period T is unique for a
given y1. Thus, the economy relies more on relational contracts in the early stages of
development (for t · T ) but more on arm's length contracts in the subsequent stages
of development (for t > T ) in the sense that each young R-producer invests more than
each young A-producer in the former stages but not in the latter stages.
To derive this result, we introduce some notations and make conditions on the
primitives of the model.
We ¯rst de¯ne the following output of A-producers:
x ´
·
¸(1¡ ®)A(¸¡®l + (1¡ l))
1¡ l
¸ 1
1¡®
(12)
and we then show that this becomes the upper bound for capital investment (production
level) which A-producers can attain in any equilibrium path in which they do not
stagnate below the initial investment level x0. To see why, note that using CMEt for
t ¸ 1, 1=¸ ¸ yt and zt+1 ¸ 0, we have that
¸(1¡ ®)Ax®t (¸¡®l + (1¡ l)) ¸ (1¡ l)xt+1 (13)
in any period t ¸ 1. Further, CME0 and ¸ < 1 imply that ¸(1¡®)Ax®0 (¸¡®l+(1¡l)) ¸
¸w0 = x1(ly1 + (1¡ l)) ¸ (1¡ l)x1. Thus, the above inequality (13) must be satis¯ed
for all periods t ¸ 0. When we consider the development process of the economy in
which each A-producer invests more in capital than the initial level x0, it is necessary
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to have x ¸ x0 because otherwise we can show that xt · x0 holds for all t ¸ 1. 20
This implies that the market economy never emerges in the sense that A-producers
always stagnate below the production level in the initial period, which is contrary to
our interest for considering the process of economic development. Thus, we need the
following condition for investigating the process such that the economy takes o® from
the initial development state.
Assumption 1. x ¸ x0.
Given Assumption 1, we can readily see from (13) that xt · x is satis¯ed in any
period t ¸ 0, that is, x becomes an upper bound for capital investment which each
A-producer chooses in any period.21
Next, we de¯ne the following value of the altruistic preference parameter (the dis-
count factor), which plays a critical role for determining equilibrium paths.
~± ´
µ
®¸
¸1¡® ¡ ¸
¶µ
l¸¡® + (1¡ l))
(1¡ l)2
¶
: (14)
Then, we make the following assumption. 22
Assumption 2. ± > ~±.
Assumption 2 can ensure a large enough gain from relational contracting (the left-
hand side of IC¤t ) which makes it possible for a relationship pair to invest more in capital
than an A-producer when the interest rate is high. Since the interest rates are high in
the early stages of development in which wage income and hence saving is low, each
young R-producer has more incentive to choose a higher investment than each young
A-producer in the early stages but not in the well-developed stages under Assumption
2.
More formally, we show the following main result of this paper.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, any equilibrium path
has the following features: if y1 > 1, then
² the relative output of R-producer yt decreases over time until it hits some critical
value less than one, denoted by y^ < 1, and thus, y1 > y2 > ¢ ¢ ¢ > y^;
20Suppose that x0 > x. Then, by the de¯nition of x, we have ¸(1¡®)A(¸¡®l+(1¡ l))x®0 · (1¡ l)x0.
Then, since CME0 implies that ¸(1¡®)A(¸¡®l+(1¡ l))x®0 ¸ (1¡ l)x1, we have x0 ¸ x1. Next, using
CMEt, we have (1 ¡ l)x0 ¸ ¸(1 ¡ ®)A(¸¡®l + (1 ¡ l))x®0 ¸ ¸(1 ¡ ®)A(¸¡®l + (1 ¡ l))x®1 ¸ (1 ¡ l)x2,
implying that x0 ¸ x2. Repeating this, we obtain xt · x0 for all t ¸ 1.
21Note that x = x1¡®x® ¸ x1¡®x®0 = [¸(1 ¡ ®)A(¸¡1l + (1 ¡ l))=(1 ¡ l)]x®0 ¸ x1 due to CME0.
Repeating this, we get x ¸ xt for all t ¸ 0.
22Here, for 1 > ± to be satis¯ed, Assumption 2 requires that 1 > ~±, which is more likely to be satis¯ed
when the number of relationship pairs l is small and the enforcement cost 1¡¸ is large. More precisely,
if we let l! 0 in ~±, then we can show that 1 > ~± holds when ¸ < (1=(1 + ®))1=®.
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² there exists a switching period T such that yt > 1 holds for all t · T but yt < 1
holds for all t > T ;
² the switching period T is unique for a given y1.
Proposition 1 states that relational contracting contributes to the process of economic
development relative to arm's length contracts more in the early stages than the later
stages of development in that the relative output of R-producer yt declines over time
until it hits some critical value y^ < 1. In particular, there exists a unique switching
period T before which relationship lending yields more capital investment and output
than the market lending based on arm's length contracts, but after which the former
yields smaller capital investment and output than the latter (see Figure 2). Proposition
1 thus con¯rms the historical argument that the Western society drastically changed
from a non-market system, which relies more on personal connections, kinship networks,
and community, to a market system in the 19th century as the Western economies grew
faster (Polanyi (1947)).
Proposition 1 supports the positive view of relational contracting that the non-
market system (the relationship-based system) is not impediment to economic growth
in the early periods but has a positive e®ect of promoting the emergence of a market
system in subsequent stages. Speci¯cally, the expansion of the relative output of R-
producer yt can save the enforcement cost associated with arm's length contracts in
the whole society, contributing to economic growth. Lamoreaux (1994) reports sup-
portive evidence that the relationship-based lending became e®ective in ¯nancing and
promoting economic growth in New England in the early 19 century where the ¯nancial
market was so immature that market-based ¯nancing was di±cult. Another related ev-
idence is the positive role of large German banks such as Commerzbank, Dresdner, and
Deutsche in having ¯nanced the rapid expansion of German industries between the late
19th century and the early 20th century. These large banks formed close and lasting
relationships with industry enterprises by o®ering low interest rates and being repre-
sented as board directors on these ¯rms (Allen (2011)). Maurer and Haber (2007) also
empirically support the positive view of relationship lending in that Mexican bankers
during 1888{1913 were largely involved in relationship lending because they optimally
responded to a large enforcement cost but they did not loot their own banks at the
expense of outside shareholders. 23
Proposition 1 also shows the other side of relational contracting: the relationship-
based system eventually declines and has serious limitations as the economy becomes
richer. Speci¯cally, our result shows that each R-producer who engages in relationship
lending eventually switches to invest less than each A-producer who engages in market
lending in the later stages of development. Lamoreaux (1994) found evidence that
insider lending practices, which had served as an important ¯nancing device in New
23Fafchamps (2000) also discusses that business networks based on personal relationships perform a
variety of valuable functions in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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England in the early 19th century, became less important and were eventually replaced
by market-based ¯nance as the United States transitioned from a capital-poor economy
to a capital-rich economy in the late 19th century. DemirgÄu»c-Kunt and Levine (2004)
also reported a related fact that bank ¯nance, which is sometimes characterized as
a long-term relationship between particular banks and ¯rms, becomes less popular
relative to market-based ¯nance, such as equity, in a more-developed country (see
Rajan and Zingales (2000) for a related argument).
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is understood as follows. The income levels
in the early stages of development are so low that total saving is limited and hence
the market interest rates are high. Since each relationship pair extracts the net gain
from relational contracting de¯ned as ®A(z®t ¡ x®t ) + rt(xt ¡ ¸zt) in period t and its
investment zt is less than (1=¸)xt (Lemma 3), a rise in the interest rate leads to a
large net gain from relational contracting, which makes the IC condition (IC¤t ) more
likely to be satis¯ed. This leads to higher capital investment by a R-producer over an
A-producer in the low-development stages in which the interest rates are expected to
be high in the credit market. However, as the economy develops well in the course
during which relationship pairs save on enforcement cost, the anonymous credit market
expands and the interest rates fall over time. Thus, each R-producer who expects low
interest rates and tight IC¤t invests less in capital and produces less than an A-producer
in the subsequent stages in which lower interest rates make arm's length contracts more
pro¯table.
As we have already mentioned, equilibrium paths are not unique because there
are multiple candidates for the equilibrium values of y1 and x1 in the ¯rst period as
long as they satisfy (11): ¸w0 = x1(¸ly1 + (1 ¡ l)). Thus, the di®erences in the
equilibrium output in the ¯rst period (x1; y1) cause the di®erent evolution patterns of
the whole economy with di®erent switching periods. Which economies with larger or
smaller relative output of R-producer y1 in the ¯rst period switch more early from the
relationship-based system to the market-based system? We now address this issue, and
give the following result.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Take any two equilibrium
paths fy0tg1t=1 and fy00t g1t=1 with the corresponding switching periods T 0 and T 00 where
y01 ¸ y001 . Then, y0t ¸ y00t holds in any period t ¸ 1 so that T 0 ¸ T 00.
Proposition 2 shows that the economy which starts with less reliance on relational
contracts (smaller y1) in the ¯rst period continues to rely less on relational contracts in
every future period and switches more early from the relationship-based phase to the
market-based phase than the economy which starts with more reliance on relational
contracts in the ¯rst period (see Figure 3). This result has the implication that the
degree to which the market-based system is currently dominant in a country depends
on the extent to which that country has relied on it in the early development phases.
We can also investigate how the switching period T changes with exogenous vari-
ables of the model economy such as the discount factor of individuals ± and the en-
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forcement cost of an arm's length contract 1¡ ¸.
Suppose for example that ± increases, that is, individuals become more altruistic
about their children. This change raises the gain from relational contracting so that
IC¤t becomes more likely to be satis¯ed. However, since IC¤t always binds in any period
t (Lemma 3), such an increase in the gain from relational contracting must be o®set
by the reduction of the relative output yt+1 of a R-producer in a future period in order
to keep IC¤t binding in equilibrium. Thus, as long as the relative output y1 in the
¯rst period does not rise by an increase in the discount factor ±, the relative output in
the second period y2 must decrease in order to keep IC¤1 binding. Repeating this, the
relative outputs of R-producers yt in all the future periods must decrease, resulting in
a decrease in the switching period T . We can also see a similar e®ect of the rise in the
enforcement cost 1 ¡ ¸. Suppose that ¸ decreases. Then, the relationship pairs face
lower opportunity costs to invest in capital such that IC¤t becomes more easily satis¯ed.
Again, such an increase in the gain from relational contracting must be o®set by the
reduction in the relative output yt+1 in the future period in order to keep IC¤t binding
in equilibrium.
More formally, by letting ³ ´ (±; 1¡ ¸), we use fyt(³)g1t=1 to denote an equilibrium
path of the relative output of R-producer by making its dependence of ± and ¸ explicit.
Let T (³) be the corresponding switching period. Then, we show that the economy
more early switches from a relationship-based system to a market-based system when
the discount factor and the enforcement cost increase as long as the ¯rst period relative
output of R-producers y1 does not increase by such a change. 24
Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let ³ 0 > ³ 00. Then, T (³ 0) ·
T (³ 00) if y1(³ 0) · y1(³ 00).
4.3 Long-Run Behaviour
We have shown that the economy switches from the development stages which rely
more on the relationship-based system to the development stages which rely more
on the market-based system. We have also shown the time structure of relational
contracting such that its value relative to an arm's length contract declines over time
until the relative output of the R-producer yt hits some critical value y^ < 1. However,
Proposition 1 does not say anything about how the relative output yt behaves over time
after it goes below the critical value y^.
To investigate the long-run behaviour of equilibrium dynamics, we de¯ne the steady
state of the economy, denoted by (~y; ~x), as yt+1 = yt = ~y and xt+1 = xt = ~x in (9) and
24Recall that there is a freedom to choose the relative output y1 in the ¯rst period t = 1 for
determining an equilibrium path. By such indeterminacy, we cannot know how y1 changes with ³.
If y1 increases with ³, it may be possible that we have T (³
0) > T (³00) even when ³0 > ³00.
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(10) which satisfy
±f~y® ¡ ¸®~y ¡ (1¡ ®)g = ¸®~y; (15)
¸(1¡ ®)A~x®(l~y® + (1¡ l)) = ~x(¸l~y + (1¡ l)): (16)
Recall that our model economy is characterized by a two-dimensional system of non-
linear di®erence equations (9) and (10). Then, we show that the economy eventually
reaches the steady state where each A-producer invests in more capital and hence
produces more than each R-producer does.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, (i) the steady sate of
the economy (~x; ~y) exists and is unique. (ii) The economy eventually converges to the
steady state (~y; ~x) in the long run where ~y < 1.
Proposition 4 states that the relationship-based system declines in the long run as
the economy develops well, although it contributes to economic development more than
the market-based system does in the early development stages.
We can also conduct a comparative statics exercise about the steady state of the
economy (~y; ~x).
Corollary. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Then, the relative output of R-producer
~y in the steady state is decreasing in the discount factor ± and the enforcement cost
1¡ ¸. Suppose also that ¸ is so small that ¸ · ®(1 ¡ l)=(1 ¡ ®). Then, the output of
A-producer ~x is also decreasing in ± and 1¡ ¸.
When individuals become more altruistic about their children (± increases), the net
gain of relational contracting (the left-hand side of (15)) increases as well. However,
since IC¤t always binds in the steady state, the relative output of a R-producer ~y must
then go down in order to make IC¤t binding. Furthermore, the decrease in the relative
output of a R-producer reduces not only the credit demand (the right-hand side of (16))
but also saving (the left-hand side of (16)) because the wage income becomes lower.
When the enforcement cost 1 ¡ ¸ is large (¸ is small), the former e®ect is dominated
by the latter e®ect so that the net credit supply decreases and thus the output of an
A-producer ~x becomes smaller as well. The comparative statics result about the change
in the enforcement cost ¸ is similarly explained as well.
5 Formation of New Relationships
5.1 Matching and Separation
We have thus far focused on the case where the measure of those who engage in rela-
tional contract, denoted by l 2 (0; 1), is exogenously ¯xed and does not change over
time. By restricting to such a case, we have investigated how the investment (output)
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levels of A-producers and R-producers change over time. Put di®erently, our analysis
has been limited to the changes in the `extensive' margin of relational and arm's length
contracts by assuming that its `intensive' margin, which is the relative measures of
those who engage in these contracting modes, is exogenous.
In this section, we will extend our basic model to allow producers and lenders to
freely ¯nd their partners and form relationship pairs. Then, we will investigate the
changes in both the intensive and extensive margins of the two contracting modes
together.
For this purpose, we introduce two twists into the basic model as follows. First, we
abandon the assumption that there is a local community where particular producers
and lenders have personal relationships. Instead, we allow every individual, irrespective
of a producer or a lender, to enter the matching market for seeking a partner and
forming a relationship pair. The producers and lenders who enter the matching market
are randomly matched with each other (we will specify the matching function below).
Second, each relationship pair is resolved with exogenous probability, in which case the
separated producer and lender enter the matching market for meeting another partners.
More speci¯cally, we denote by lst the measure of relationship pairs of young R-
producers and young R-lenders whose predecessors have started the relationships from
period s and are not still dissolved in the beginning of period t ¸ s. Each of those lst
relationship pairs will continue to be matched and carried over the next generation in
period t + 1 with probability °t 2 (0; 1), while the relationship will be dissolved with
probability 1 ¡ °t. We also introduce an uncertainty into the exogenous separation
probability 1 ¡ °t 2 (0; 1) such that the set of possible separation shocks is given by
¡ ´ f°1; :::; °ng and °t = °i is realized with probability qi 2 (0; 1) where
P
i=n q
i = 1
and °1 < ¢ ¢ ¢ < °n ´ 1 (here we set °n = 1 without loss of generality). Such
uncertainty allows us to generate an endogenous process that relationship pairs can be
heterogeneous with respect to the exogenous separation shock °t 2 ¡ they face when
making relational contracts. Then, we can address the dynamic issue of how each
relationship switches from engaging in relational contract to arm's length contract in
some periods although it relies on the former in other periods.25
We assume that a young R-producer and a young R-lender of relationship pair, born
in period t¡ 1, know how much likely is their relationship to continue to their children
in the next period t, that is, they know the realization of °t before making a capital
investment decision. Thus a relational contract in period t can be contingent on the
realization of the exogenous separation shock °t. However, we assume that they do not
know how likely is it that the relationship in the next generation will be resolved, that
is, they do not know the exogenous separation shock °t+1 such that the relationship of
their children will be resolved.
The events in a period proceeds as follows (see Figure 4 for the time line). When a
25Without any such uncertainty about °t, every formed relationship pair engages in either relational
contract or arm's length contract from the outset when the relationship starts. Then we cannot address
the dynamic issue of how the relationships engaging in relational contracts endogenously switch to arm's
length contracts over time.
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relationship was not dissolved in the previous period and the separation shock of °t was
observed to them, a young R-producer and a young R-lender of the relationship, born
in period t¡1, have the following options: one is to continue the relationship by imple-
menting the agreed upon relational contract and the other is to go to the anonymous
credit market for earning the pro¯ts of arm's length contract without dissolving the
relationship.26 When a R-producer and a R-lender become old, they have the following
options: one is to go to the matching market for seeking another partners for their
children (the details of the matching market will be given below) and the other is to
keep the relationship carried over the next generation. All the relationship pairs of old
R-producers and old R-lenders who were fully separated have nothing but to go to the
matching market as well as all old A-producers and old A-lenders do so. Then, if a
match between an old producer and an old lender in the matching market is successful,
their children will start new relationships. Otherwise, their children must engage in
arm's length contract in the anonymous credit market.
The matching market is modelled as follows: when there are lp;t old producers and
ll;t old lenders in the matching market for seeking relationship partners, we assume
that they are randomly matched with each other according to the matching function
M(lp;t; ll;t) where M exhibits the constant returns to scale. Since every existing re-
lationship is dissolved exogenously with the same average probability ¹ ´ Pi qi°i,27
lp;t = ll;t always holds in any period t in any equilibrium. Thus, each old producer
(respectively, lender) is matched with an old lender (respectively, producer) in the
matching market with probability M(lp;t; ll;t)=li;t = m ´M(1; 1) for i = p; l.
We denote by fzst (°t); Rst (°t); dst (°t)gt¸s a sequence of relational contracts from
period t onward, which is agreed by a relationship pair matched in period s (see Figure
5 for the time line). Here, capital investment zst (°t) and repaymentR
s
t (°t) depend on the
realization of the separation shock °t 2 ¡ because, by the above assumption, the young
R-producer and the young R-lender, born in period t¡1, know the separation shock °t
in period t before they make a capital investment decision in period t¡1. dst (°t) 2 f0; 1g
is the indicator function which takes one only when the young relationship pair decides
to engage in a relational contract instead of going to the outside credit market after
having observed the separation shock °t.
5.2 Equilibrium with Formation of New Relationships
Given the above modi¯cation of the basic model, we show that relational contracting
contributes to economic development in the early stages but it declines in the later
stages in terms of not only its extensive margin but also its intensive margin: each
26There is also the third option that the young R-producer and young R-lender fully dissolve the
relationship and engage in arm's length contract in the anonymous credit market. However, we can
show that this case never happens on equilibrium path because they ¯nd it optimal to continue the
relationship rather than voluntarily dissolve it.
27Also all relationships are never voluntarily dissolved in any equilibrium as we have noted in footnote
26.
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R-producer invests less than each A-producer does over time as well as the measure of
the relationships who engage in relational contracts becomes smaller over time.
In this subsection we will give an informal and intuitive argument for this result
(see Appendix for more detailed analysis).
The fraction of the relationship pairs
Pt
s=0
Pn
i=1 q
idst (°
i)lst that engage in relational
contract rather than go to the outside credit market changes over time because the
decision to implement a relational contract dst (°) 2 f0; 1g is an endogenous object.
Then we will see how such implementation decisions fdst (°)gt¸s evolve over time by
modifying the incentive compatibility condition as follows: let Jst denote the sum of
expected pro¯ts of an old R-producer and an old R-lender in period t whose predecessors
have started the relationship from period s. If their parents decided to go to the
matching market instead of continuing the relationship in period t ¡ 1, they would
obtain the sum of the expected pro¯ts in period t asmJ tt+(1¡m)(¸rtwt¡1+¼t) because
in the matching market each of their parents ¯nds a di®erent partner with matching
probabilitym in which case they would obtain the sum of expected pro¯ts J tt by starting
a new relationship formed in period t while each of their parents fails to match a new
partner with probability 1 ¡ m in which case they would obtain the sum of pro¯ts
¸rtwt¡1 + ¼t by engaging in arm's length contract in the credit market. Thus, the net
gain from relational contracting in period t ¸ s becomes Jst ¡mJ tt¡(1¡m)(¸rtwt¡1+¼t)
for the relationship that has lasted from period s.
Then, we can show that the previous IC constraint IC¤t is replaced by the new one,
called A-ICst (°), for a relationship that has lasted from period s and faces the exogenous
separation shock ° 2 ¡ in period t ¸ s as follows:
°±fJst+1 ¡mJ t+1t+1 ¡ (1¡m)(¼t+1 + ¸rt+1wt)g ¸ ¸rtzst (°): (A-ICst (°))
As in the previous IC, the gain from relational contracting, captured by the left hand
side of the above inequality, must be at least as large as the opportunity cost of investing
in capital ¸rtzst (°) under relational contract, captured by its right hand side. The
main di®erence from the original IC¤t is here that the net gain from honouring the
relational contract (the left-hand side of A-ICst (°)) is multiplied by the probability of
the relationship being continued ° 2 ¡ and the probability of meeting a new partner in
the matching market m. Since the relationship is resolved with exogenous probability
1¡ °, the net gain from relational contracting is realized with probability °. Further,
since the R-producer and R-lender could obtain the sum of expected pro¯ts mJ t+1t+1 +
(1¡m)(¼t+1+¸rt+1wt) even if they separated from each other, such outside gain should
be subtracted from the net surplus the relationship pair can extract from the current
match.
Here, the net gain from relational contracting Jst+1 ¡mJ t+1t+1 ¡ (1 ¡m)(¸rt+1wt +
¼t+1) depends on how many separation shocks °t+1 2 ¡ will result in the decision to
implement the agreed upon relational contract in period t+1. When many separation
shocks cause the future decisions to go to the outside credit market, i.e., dst+1(°) =
0 for many ° 2 ¡, such gain from relational contracting becomes so small that it
becomes di±cult to enforce the agreed upon relational contract in the current period.
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Also, as we have seen in the basic model, since the interest rates fall over time as the
outside credit market expands, the gain from relational contracting tends to be small
during the development process. By combining these e®ects, A-ICst (°) becomes more
stringent for lower ° as the economy proceeds to develop well over time. Eventually, the
relationships facing more severe separation shocks (lower °) decide not to implement
relational contract but to switch to arm's length contract in the credit market in the
later stages of development.
More formally, we can show the following result.
Proposition 5. Suppose that qn > m. Then, there exist some y^ 2 (0; 1=¸) and
¸ 2 (0; 1) such that, for all ¸ 2 (0; ¸), in any equilibrium path the relational contract
agreed by each relationship pair formed in period s ¸ 0 has the following dynamic
pattern:
(i) Intensive Margin: there exists a sequence of the cut-o® periods fT s(°i)gki=1 for
some k (1 · k · n) such that dst (°i) = 0 for all t ¸ T s(°i) where T s(°1) · ¢ ¢ ¢ ·
T s(°k).
(ii) Extensive Margin: the relative output of R-producer, de¯ned by yst (°
i) ´ zst (°i)=xt
for i · k, decreases over time as long as the relationship chooses a higher relative
output yst (°
i) than the cut-o® value y^, i.e., as long as yst (°
i) > y^.
Proposition 5 shows that relational contracting contributes to economic develop-
ment in the early stages but its role declines over time in both intensive and extensive
margins: the relationships that face a separation shock °i switch to engage in arm's
length contract after the cut-o® period T s(°i) and such switching becomes more early
for the relationships that face more severe separation shocks (i.e., the cut-o® period
T s(°) decreases with °). Also, in the development stages in which each R-producer
invests more than an A-producer, its relative output declines over time as shown in
Proposition 1.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated a dynamic general equilibrium model that takes into
account the dynamic change in the contract enforcement modes from relational con-
tracts to arm's length contracts over time. We have shown that relational contracting
plays an important role in sustaining production in the early stages of the development
process in which arm's length contracting does not function well to support capital
investment. In subsequent periods, producers ¯nd it pro¯table to use arm's length con-
tracts because the economy is so well-developed that the market size is large and the
interest rate falls. Thus, as the economy enters its mature stages, relationship-based
systems decline and may be partially replaced by market-based systems. We have fo-
cused on relational contracting between borrowers and lenders, which becomes valuable
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for relating our theoretical results to the historical evidence on relationship-based ¯-
nancing. This is one of the modelling choices that capture relational contracting in
dynamic general equilibrium frameworks. It is important to investigate how the devel-
opment process is dynamically linked with long-term relationships in di®erent contexts
such as ¯rm-worker relationships, inter-¯rm relationships, and government-public rela-
tionships.
We conclude the paper by brie°y discussing the role of bequest transfers between
successive generations. In the main text, we have assumed that each old individual has
no technology to give his or her child bequest. One might think that old individuals
will bequeath their children when bequest is available because they care about the
consumption levels of their children. The possibility of bequest allows each producer to
¯nance a part of capital investment from the bequest he has received from his parent.
Thus, A-producers can reduce the enforcement cost and relationship pairs are more
likely to satisfy IC¤t by using bequest to ¯nance capital investment. However, we can
show that no old individuals bequeath to their children at all, as in our basic setting,
as long as the altruistic parameter value ± belongs to a certain small range (a more
detailed analysis is relegated to the Online Appendix).
7 Appendix: Proofs for Lemmas and Propositions
In this section we will give the formal proofs for the lemmas and propositions presented
in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1.
(i) For a relationship pair born in period t¡ 1 to be inherited by the next generation,
IC¤s and TSs must be satis¯ed for all s ¸ t. Otherwise, IC¤~t or TS~t is violated in some
period ~t ¸ t, which implies that at least one of IC~t, IRL~t and IRP~t is violated so that
the relationship pair born in period ~t¡1 is dissolved. By anticipating this and using the
backward induction argument, every relationship pair born in any period before ~t ¡ 2
would not have the incentive to maintain the relationship. On the other hand, if both
IC¤s and TSs are satis¯ed for all s ¸ t, then we can show that there exists a subgame
perfect equilibrium in which every relationship pair born in period s ¸ t ¡ 1 honours
the relational contract fzs; Rsg, which satis¯es all ICs, IRPs, and IRLs for all s ¸ t.
To see this, assume that IC¤s and TSs hold for all s ¸ t. Then, we can ¯nd a sequence
of relational contracts fzs; Rsg1s=t such that all ICs, IRPs, and IRLs are satis¯ed.28
Take a sequence of relational contracts fzs; Rsg1s=t which satis¯es ICs, IRPs and
IRLs for all s ¸ t. Then, we can show that the following strategies played by R-
producers and R-lenders can constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium in a continuation
28For example, we can set Rs = ¸rszs in every period s ¸ t ¸ 1 and R0 2 (0; ¼0), which satisfy
all ICs, IRPs, and IRLs with some zs in every period s ¸ t ¸ 0. Also, note that IC¤t implies that
ptzt > ¸rtzt for t ¸ 2 and TS0 implies that p1z1 > ¸r1z1. Thus we can ¯nd Rt to ensure non-negative
consumption NNCt that ptzt ¸ Rt ¸ ¡¸rt(wt¡1 ¡ zt) for all t ¸ 1 as well as ¼0 ¸ R0 ¸ 0.
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equilibrium from period t onward:
² Period s ¸ t:
{ The young R-producer and young R-lender of each relationship agree to
the relational contract fzs+1; Rs+1g29 if their parents agreed and honoured
the relational contract fzs; Rsg in the previous period. Otherwise, they
simultaneously exercise the quitting option.
² Period s+ 1:
{ The old R-producer honours to make the repayment Rs+1 and does not
exercise the quitting option, provided his and the R-lender's parents did not
exercise the quitting option in the previous period.
{ The old R-lender does not exercise the quitting option, provided her and
the R-producer's parents did not exercise the quitting option in the previous
period.
The above strategies specify the trigger strategy-like feature as follows: if a young
R-producer and a young R-lender agree to the relational contract fzs+1; Rs+1g in period
s and they actually behave according to that contract in period s + 1, their children
will decide to continue the relationship in period s + 1 and follow the agreement of
the relational contract fzs+2; Rs+2g in the next period s+ 2. Suppose that this is not
the case. That is, they agree to a di®erent contract fz0s+1; R0s+1g 6= fzs+1; Rs+1g or
they agree to the speci¯ed contract but some of them does not implement it (e.g., the
R-producer reneges on the repayment Rs+1) in period s+1. If this were the case, their
children would play a continuation equilibrium in which they simultaneously decide
to exercise the quitting option in period s + 1. Here, note that we always have a
continuation equilibrium in which any R-producer and any R-lender of any relationship
pair simultaneously exercise the quitting option because the relationship pair is resolved
as long as at least one partner decides to exercise the quitting option.
Then, because ICs, IRLs, and IRPs are satis¯ed in any period s ¸ t, the R-producer
and R-lender never make any pro¯table deviation from agreeing the speci¯ed relational
contract fzs+1; Rs+1g and implementing it, ensuring that the relationship is inherited
by the next generation.
(ii) First, the optimal relational contract should solve the following problem:
max
fztg1t=1
1X
t=1
¯t¡1Jt
subject to IC¤t and TSt¡1, t = 1; 2; :::. Here, IC¤t , t ¸ 1, implies that TSt holds for all
t ¸ 2. Also, TS1 is satis¯ed when TS0 and IC¤1 hold. Thus only the relevant TSt is TS0.
29For example, we can suppose that a young R-producer o®ers fzs+1; Rt+1g to the young R-lender
matching him.
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This shows that the optimal relational contract should maximize
P1
t=0 ¯
tJt subject to
IC¤t for t ¸ 1 and TS0.
Second, note that ^¸x(rt) maximizes ®Az®t ¡ ¸rtzt over zt ¸ 0. Suppose now that
zt > ^¸x(rt) in some period t. Then, if we can slightly decrease zt, we can still keep
IC¤t , IC¤t¡1 and TS0. Note that zt a®ects only IC¤t , IC¤t¡1 and possibly TS0. The slight
decrease of zt makes IC¤t easier to be satis¯ed while it increases the left hand side of
IC¤t¡1 and TS0 (when considering the choice of z1) because ^¸x(rt) maximizes the left
hand side of IC¤t¡1 and TS0 (when considering z1). But then such change increases the
joint pro¯t Jt = ®Azt¡¸rtzt+¸rtwt¡1 due to the de¯nition of ^¸x(rt). Thus zt · ^¸x(rt)
holds.
(iii) Suppose that zt < ^¸x(rt) but IC¤t is not binding in some period t. Then, if we
can slightly increase zt toward ^¸x(rt), we can still keep IC¤t and IC¤t¡1. The slight
increase of zt does not violate IC¤t while it increases the left hand side of IC¤t¡1 because
of zt < ^¸x(rt). This does not violate TS0 as well. But then such change increases the
joint pro¯t Jt due to the de¯nition of ^¸x(rt). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Suppose contrary to the claim that zs > ws¡1 holds in some period s in some equi-
librium path. In such equilibrium each R-producer must ¯nance the remaining capital
investment zs ¡ ws¡1 > 0 from the credit market after he borrows ws¡1 from the
R-lender matching him.
There are two cases: (i) zs¡1 · ws¡2 and (ii) zs¡1 > ws¡2.
Case (i): zs¡1 · ws¡2. In case (i), the R-producer in period s¡2 does not ¯nance from
the credit market. Thus, in case (i), ICs¡1 for R-producer and IRLs¡1 for R-lender
should be modi¯ed to
ps¡1zs¡1 ¡Rs¡1 + ±fpszs ¡Rs ¡ rs(zs ¡ ws¡1)g ¸ ps¡1zs¡1 + ±¼s (IC0s¡1)
and
Rs¡1 + ¸rs¡1(ws¡2 ¡ zs¡1) + ±Rs ¸ ¸rs¡1ws¡2 + ±¸rsws¡1 (IRL0s¡1)
Combining these conditions, IC¤s¡1 must be changed to
±f®Az®s ¡ rszs ¡ ¼s + (1¡ ¸)rsws¡1g ¸ ¸rs¡1zs¡1: (IC¤s¡1-(i))
Also, in case (i) the joint pro¯t in period s is given by Js = ®Az®s ¡ rszs + rsws¡1
because capital investment zs ¡ ws¡1 > 0 must be ¯nanced from the credit market.
Case (ii): zs¡1 > ws¡2. In case (ii), the R-producer in period s ¡ 2 ¯nances the
remaining amount zs¡1 ¡ ws¡2 from the credit market after borrowing ws¡2 directly
from the R-lender. Thus, in case (ii), ICs¡1 for R-producer and IRLs¡1 for R-lender
should be modi¯ed to
ps¡1zs¡1 ¡Rs¡1 ¡ rs¡1(zs¡1 ¡ ws¡2) + ±fpszs ¡Rs ¡ rs(zs ¡ ws¡1)g
¸ ps¡1zs¡1 ¡ rs¡1(zs¡1 ¡ ws¡2) + ±¼s
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and
Rs¡1 + ±Rs ¸ ¸rs¡1ws¡2 + ±¸rsws¡1 (IRL0s¡1)
Combining these conditions, IC¤s¡1 must be changed to
±f®Az®s ¡ rszs ¡ ¼s + (1¡ ¸)rsws¡1g ¸ ¸rs¡1ws¡2: (IC¤s¡1-(ii))
In case (ii) the joint pro¯t in period s is given by Js = ®Az®s ¡ rszs + rsws¡1 again.
In both cases (i) and (ii) the credit market equilibrium in period s¡ 1 is modi¯ed
as
(1¡ l)¸ws¡1 = l(zs ¡ ws¡1) + (1¡ l)xs (CME0)
because l R-producers require the capital demand zs ¡ ws¡1 > 0 each in the credit
market in addition to the credit demand xs of A-producers each while (1¡ l) A-lenders
supply the capital ws¡1 each. Then CME0 is written by (l+(1¡l)¸)ws¡1 = lzs+(1¡l)xs.
Since zs > ws¡1 by our supposition, this yields (l + (1¡ l)¸)zs > (l + (1¡ l)¸)ws¡1 =
lzs + (1¡ l)xs, which in turn implies that zs > ¸zs > xs.
However, the joint pro¯t of the relationship pair in period s is given by Js =
®Az®s ¡ rszs + rsws¡1 which is maximized at xs = x(rs). Then Js can increase by
reducing zs slightly because zs > xs = x(rs). Since IC¤s¡1¡(i), IC¤s¡1¡(ii) and TS0
are more likely to be satis¯ed when zs decreases toward x(rs), the original relational
contract cannot be optimal as long as the incentive compatibility constraint in period
s is not violated when zs is slightly decreased.
We verify this last point.
Case (1): zs+1 · ws. In this case, by using a similar argument and noting that
zs > ws¡1 by our supposition, we can show that the incentive compatibility constraint
in period s is modi¯ed as
±f®Az®s+1 ¡ ¸rs+1zs+1 ¡ ¼s+1g ¸ ¸rsws¡1
Case (2): zs+1 > ws. In this case we modify the incentive compatibility constraint in
period s+ 1 as
±f®Az®s+1 ¡ rs+1zs+1 ¡ ¼s+1 + (1¡ ¸)rs+1wsg ¸ ¸rsws¡1
Either case (1) or (2) above is not a®ected by zs. Thus a slight decrease in zs does not
violate these constraints. Thus we prove that zs > ws¡1 never happens in any period
in any equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3.
By CMEt we have
¸l(wt ¡ zt+1) + ¸(1¡ l)wt = (1¡ l)xt+1
where wt ¸ zt+1 due to Lemma 2. Thus, the above equality implies that ¸(1¡ l)wt ·
(1 ¡ l)xt+1 and hence ¸wt · xt+1. Since zt+1 · wt holds by Lemma 2 again, we have
¸zt+1 · ¸wt · xt+1 which shows that xt+1 ¸ ¸zt+1.
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Since ^¸ > ¸¡1, we then obtain ^¸xt+1 > ¸¡1xt+1 ¸ zt+1 which implies that ^¸xt+1 >
zt+1. Then (IC¤t+1) is binding due to Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Suppose that Assumption 1 and 2 are satis¯ed. By Assumption 1, we know that xt · x
holds in any period t in any equilibrium path.
By using (10) (i.e., CMEt) in the main text, we obtainµ
xt+1
xt
¶®
= x®¡1t+1
¸(1¡ ®)A(ly®t + (1¡ l))
¸lyt+1 + (1¡ l)
¸ x®¡1¸(1¡ ®)A(ly
®
t + (1¡ l))
¸lyt+1 + (1¡ l)
=
1¡ l
l¸¡® + (1¡ l)
ly®t + (1¡ l)
¸lyt+1 + (1¡ l)
¸ (1¡ l)
2
l¸¡® + (1¡ l)
where the ¯rst inequality follows from the fact that xt · x for all t and the second
inequality from 0 · yt · ¸¡1 (Lemma 2) respectively.
Then, by using the above fact, we can write (9) (i.e., IC¤t ) in the main text as
¸®yt =
µ
xt+1
xt
¶®
±fy®t+1 ¡ ¸®yt+1 ¡ (1¡ ®)g
¸ (1¡ l)
2
l¸¡® + (1¡ l)±fy
®
t+1 ¡ ¸®yt+1 ¡ (1¡ ®)g:
Now, we will show that the right hand side of this inequality, denoted by F (yt+1), is
greater than its left hand side ¸®yt when yt+1 = yt = 1. To see this, de¯ne
f(y) ´ y
® ¡ ¸®y ¡ (1¡ ®)
y
over [y; 1=¸] where y > 0 is de¯ned as y which satisfying y® ¡ ¸®y ¡ (1 ¡ ®) = 0.
In any equilibrium yt ¸ y must be satis¯ed. Then we can show that f(y) = 0 and
f(¸¡1) = ¸1¡® ¡ ¸ > 0. Also we can verify that f 0(y) = (1 ¡ ®)y¡2(1 ¡ y®) so that
f 0 = 0 at y = 1 and f 0 > (<)0 for y < (>)1. Then we can show that f(y) > f(¸¡1) for
all y 2 [1; 1=¸).
Since Assumption 2 (± ¸ ~±) implies that ±
³
(1¡l)2
(¸¡®l+(1¡l))
´
f(¸¡1) > ¸®, we have
±
³
(1¡l)2
(¸¡®l+(1¡l))
´
f(y) > ±
³
(1¡l)2
(¸¡®l+(1¡l))
´
f(¸¡1) > ¸® for all y 2 [1; 1=¸) so that F (y) >
¸®y for all y 2 [1; 1=¸). Then, if the economy starts with y1 > 1, any equilibrium path
fytg1t=1 which must satisfy F (yt+1) · ¸®yt decreases over time until it hits y^ < 1 such
that F (y^) = ¸®y^. Here, such y^ is unique and y^ < 1 holds due to ± ¸ ~±. Also, since yt
monotonically decreases over time until it hits y^ < 1, there exists a switching period T
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such that yt > 1 for all t < T while yt < 1 for all t > T .
Uniqueness: ¯nally, we show that the switching period T de¯ned above is unique
once we ¯x the relative output of R-producer y1 in the ¯rst period (t = 1). To see this,
we show that equilibrium path fytg1t=1 of the relative output is uniquely determined
for a given y1. Then, since any equilibrium path fytg1t=1 is decreasing over time when
yt < y^, the switching period T must be unique for a given y1.
Fix a (x1; y1) which satis¯es CME0: ¸w0 = x1(¸ly1 + (1 ¡ l)). By using (9), we
obtain µ
xt+1
xt
¶
±1=®[y®t+1 ¡ ¸®yt+1 ¡ (1¡ ®)]1=® = (¸®)1=®y1=®t : (A1)
Also we can re-write (10) as
xt+1
xt
= ¸(1¡ ®)A ly
®
t + (1¡ l)
¸lyt+1 + (1¡ l)x
®¡1
t
which we substitute into (xt+1=xt) of (A1) in order to obtain
¸1¡1=®(1¡ ®)A±1=® [y
®
t+1 ¡ ¸®yt+1 ¡ (1¡ ®)]1=®
¸lyt+1 + (1¡ l) =
®1=®x1¡®t
ly
®¡1=®
t + (1¡ l)y¡1=®t
: (A2)
We denote by g(yt+1; ±) the left hand side of (A2) and by Ã(yt; xt) the right hand side
of (A2) respectively. Then we can show that
@g
@yt+1
/ (1¡ l)(y®¡1t ¡ ¸) + ¸(1¡ ®)l(1¡ ¸yt)
> 0
due to yt · ^¸ ´ ¸1=(®¡1).
By using CMEt¡1, i.e., ¸wt¡1 = xt(¸lyt+(1¡l)), and substituting xt = ¸wt¡1=(¸lyt+
(1¡ l)) into Ã(yt; xt), we obtain
~Ã(yt; wt¡1) ´ ®
1=®(¸wt¡1)1¡®
(ly®¡1=®t + (1¡ l)y¡1=®t )(¸lyt + (1¡ l))1¡®
where we can verify that ~Ã is increasing in yt and wt¡1.
Also, by using LMEt and CMEt, we also obtain
wt = ¸(1¡ ®)Ax®t (ly®t + (1¡ l))
= ¸(1¡ ®)A
µ
¸wt¡1
¸lyt + (1¡ l)
¶®
(ly®t + (1¡ l))
´ ~w(yt; wt¡1)
Here we can veriy that ~w is increasing in yt:
@ ~w
@yt
/ (1¡ l)l®(y®¡1t ¡ ¸) > 0
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due to yt < ^¸. ~w is also increasing in wt¡1 as well. From this, we can show the following:
de¯ne w1 = w^(y1) ´ ~w(y1; w0) which is uniquely determined once we ¯x y1 because w0
is exogenously given. Next we de¯ne w2 = w^(y2; y1) ´ ~w(y2; w1) = w(y2; w^(y1)) where
w^(y2; y1) is increasing in both y1 and y2 because ~w(y2; w1) is increasing in y2 and w1
as well as w1 = w^(y1) is increasing in y1. Thus w^(y2; y1) is uniquely determined once
we ¯x y2 and y1. Then we can de¯ne wt = w^(yt; yt¡1; :::; y1) in the similar way where
w^ is increasing in each argument.
By substituting wt¡1 = w^(yt¡1; yt¡2; :::; y1) into ~Ã(yt; wt¡1), we have
Á(yt; yt¡1; :::; y1) ´ ~Ã(yt; w^(yt¡1; :::; y1))
which is increasing in each argument because ~Ã is increasing. Then the equilibrium
path fytg1t=1 recursively satis¯es g(yt+1; ±) = Á(yt; :::; y1) for a given y1. Since g(y2; ±)
is increasing with y2 and g(y; ±) = 0, the equilibrium value of y2 which satis¯es
g(y2; ±) = Á(y1) must be unique for a given y1. Also, the equilibrium value of y3
which satis¯es g(y3; ±) = Á(y2; y1) must be also unique. Repeating this, it must be that
yt+1 which satis¯es g(yt+1; ±) = Á(yt; :::; y1) must be unique for a given y1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
In the proof of Proposition 1 we have shown that an equilibrium path fytg1t=1 is de-
termined by solving g(yt+1; ±) = Á(yt; yt¡1; :::; y1) recursively. Here recall that Á is
increasing in each argument and g is increasing in yt+1. Take any two equilibrium
paths fy0tg1t=1 and fy00t g1t=1 with y01 ¸ y001 . Then, since g(y2; ±) = Á(y1) holds, we have
y02 ¸ y002 when y01 ¸ y001 . Also, since g(y3; ±) = Á(y2; y1) and y0t ¸ y00t for t = 1; 2, we have
y03 ¸ y003 . Repeating this, we can see from g(yt+1; ±) = Á(yt; yt¡1; :::; y1) that y0t+1 ¸ y00t+1
because y0s ¸ y00s for all s · t¡ 1.
Since y0t ¸ y00t holds in any period t and these equilibrium paths decrease over time
until they hit the same critical value y^ < 1, the corresponding switching periods T 0 and
T 00 must have the property that T 0 ¸ T 00. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
First, suppose that ±0 > ±00 for a given ¸. Then, let ³ 0 ´ (±0; 1¡ ¸) > ³ 00 ´ (±00; 1¡ ¸).
Note that g(y; ±) which was de¯ned in the proof of Proposition 1 is increasing in both
y and ±. Thus, since g(y2(³); ±) = Á(y1(³)) and Á is increasing, we have y2(³ 0) · y2(³ 00)
if y1(³ 0) · y1(³ 00). In the recursive way we can show that yt+1(³ 0) · yt+1(³ 00) holds
for any t ¸ 1 because g(yt+1(³); ±) = Á(yt(³); :::; y1(³)) holds, Á is increasing in each
argument and ys(³ 0) · ys(³ 00) for all s · t.
Next, suppose that ¸0 < ¸00 for a given ±. Then, let ³ 0 ´ (±; 1¡¸0) > ³ 00 ´ (±; 1¡¸00).
We verify that ~Ã is increasing in ¸ while g is decreasing in ¸. We can also show that
w^(yt; :::; y1) is increasing in ¸ for all t ¸ 1. Thus Á is increasing in ¸ as well. Since
g is decreasing and Á is increasing in ¸, yt(³ 0) · yt(³ 00) holds for all t ¸ 1 when
y1(³ 0) · y1(³ 00). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.
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We ¯rst show that there exists a unique steady state. For this purpose, it su±ces to
show that there exists a unique ~y which satis¯es (15) because then there exists a unique
~x satisfying (16). Let D(y) ´ ±fy®¡¸®y¡(1¡®)g¡¸®y over the domain y 2 [y; 1=¸].
Then we can show that D(y) = ¡¸®y < 0 and that D(1) = ®(±(1 ¡ ¸) ¡ ¸) > 0
due to Assumption 2. Also D(¸¡1) = ±(¸¡1 ¡ 1) ¡ ® > 0 due to Assumption 2 and
D00 = ®(® ¡ 1)±y®¡2 < 0. Thus D is strictly concave with D(y) < 0, D(1) > 0 and
D(¸¡1) > 0. Then there exists a unique ~y 2 (y; 1=¸) such that D(~y) = 0 where ~y < 1
holds.
Next, we show that the economy eventually converges to a unique steady state (~y; ~x)
de¯ned in (15) and (16) in the main text under Assumption 1 and 2.
We already know from Proposition 1 that yt < 1 holds for all large t. Thus in what
follows we suppose that yt < 1 without loss of generality.
By substituting the following CMEt
¸(1¡ ®)Ax®t (ly®t + (1¡ l)) = xt+1(¸yt+1 + (1¡ l)) (CMEt)
into the following IC¤tµ
xt+1
xt
¶®
±fy®t+1 ¡ ¸®yt+1 ¡ (1¡ ®)g = ¸®yt; (IC¤t )
we obtain
¸(1¡ ®)Ax®¡1t+1
±fy®t+1 ¡ ¸®yt+1 ¡ (1¡ ®)g
¸lyt+1 + (1¡ l) =
¸®yt
ly®t + (1¡ l)
: (A3)
We de¯ne
h(y; y00) ´
·
¸(1¡ ®)A(ly® + (1¡ l))
¸ly00 + (1¡ l)
¸ 1
1¡®
:
From CMEt together with y < yt < 1, we have ¸(1 ¡ ®)Ax®t (ly® + (1 ¡ l)) ·
xt+1(¸l + (1¡ l)) which implies that xt is eventually larger than h(y; 1):
xt ¸ h(y; 1) ´
·
¸(1¡ ®)A(ly® + (1¡ l))
¸l + (1¡ l)
¸ 1
1¡®
(A4)
for all large t. Then (A3) implies that for all large t:
¸(1¡ ®)Ah(y; 1)®¡1 ±fy
®
t+1 ¡ ¸®yt+1 ¡ (1¡ ®)g
¸lyt+1 + (1¡ l) ¸
¸®yt
ly®t + (1¡ l)
which is equivalent toµ
¸l + (1¡ l)
ly® + (1¡ l)
¶
±fy®t+1 ¡ ¸®yt+1 ¡ (1¡ ®)g
¸lyt+1 + (1¡ l) ¸
¸®yt
ly®t + (1¡ l)
: (A5)
for all large t. Letting H(yt+1) denote the left hand side of (A5), we can verify that
H(1) > ¸® that is equivalent to ± > (ly® + (1 ¡ l))¸=(1 ¡ ¸) implied by ± > ~±. Also,
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H(y) = 0 < ¸®y. Thus there exists some y, denoted by y¤(1), such that y¤(1) 2 (y; 1)
and H(y¤(1)) = ¸®y¤(1) (if such y¤(1) are multiple, we take the smallest one). Then
(A5) shows that yt ¸ y¤(1) eventually holds for all large enough t.
Next, by using CMEt and y < yt < 1, we have
¸(1¡ ®)Ax®t ¸ xt+1(¸ly + (1¡ l))
which implies that
xt+1 · h(1; y) =
·
¸(1¡ ®)A
¸ly + (1¡ l)
¸ 1
1¡®
(A6)
for all large t. By combining this with (A3), we obtain
¸(1¡ ®)Ah(1; y)®¡1 ±fy
®
t+1 ¡ ¸®yt+1 ¡ (1¡ ®)g
¸lyt+1 + (1¡ l) ·
¸®yt
ly®t + (1¡ l)
:
which is equivalent to
(¸ly + (1¡ l))±fy
®
t+1 ¡ ¸®yt+1 ¡ (1¡ ®)g
¸lyt+1 + (1¡ l) ·
¸®yt
ly®t + (1¡ l)
(A7)
for all large t. When we set yt+1 = yt = 1, the left hand side of (A7) is equal to
±
³
®(1¡¸)(¸ly+(1¡l))
¸l+(1¡l)
´
which is larger than ¸® due to ± > ~±. Thus there exists some y,
denoted by y¤¤(1), such that y¤¤(1) 2 (y; 1) and the both sides of (A7) are equal at
yt+1 = yt = y¤¤(1) (if such y¤¤(1) are multiple, we take the largest one). Then we can
verify from (A7) that yt · y¤¤(1) holds for large enough t.
We have thus established that y¤(1) · yt · y¤¤(1) holds for all large enough t.
Next, since y¤(1) · yt · y¤¤(1) for all large t, we can verify that xt ¸ h(y¤(1); y¤¤(1))
and xt · h(y¤¤(1); y¤(1)) for all large t. Then, by using the similar step to (A5), we
can show that
¸ly¤¤(1) + (1¡ l)
l(y¤(1))® + (1¡ l)
±fy®t+1 ¡ ¸®yt+1 ¡ (1¡ ®)g
¸lyt+1 + (1¡ l) ¸
¸®yt
ly®t + (1¡ l)
(A8)
for all large t. Here the left hand side of (A8) is less than its right hand side at
yt+1 = yt = y¤(1) if and only if
¸ly¤¤(1) + (1¡ l)
l(y¤(1))® + (1¡ l) <
¸l + (1¡ l)
ly® + (1¡ l)
which holds because of y¤¤(1) < 1 and y¤(1) > y. Also the left hand side of (A8) is
larger than its right hand side at yt+1 = yt = 1 if and only ifµ
¸ly¤¤(1) + (1¡ l)
l(y¤(1))® + (1¡ l)
¶µ
±®(1¡ ¸)
¸l + (1¡ l)
¶
> ¸® (A9)
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which holds due to ± > ~± ¸
³
l¸¡®+(1¡l)
(1¡l)2
´³
¸
1¡¸
´
, y¤¤(1) > 0 and y¤(1) < 1 < ¸¡1. Thus
there exists some y¤(2) 2 (y¤(1); 1) such that the left hand side of (A8) is equal to its
right hand side at yt+1 = yt = y¤(2) (if such y¤(2) are multiple, we take the smallest
one). Then we obtain from (A8) the result that yt ¸ y¤(2) for all large enough t.
Since xt · h(y¤¤(1); y¤(1)) for all large t, by a similar argument to (A7), we can
also show that
¸ly¤(1) + (1¡ l)
l(y¤¤(1))® + (1¡ l)
±fy®t+1 ¡ ¸®yt+1 ¡ (1¡ ®)g
¸lyt+1 + (1¡ l) ·
¸®yt
ly®t + (1¡ l)
(A10)
for all large t. The left hand side of (A10) is larger than its right hand side at yt+1 =
yt = y¤¤(1) if and only if
¸ly¤(1) + (1¡ l)
l(y¤¤(1))® + (1¡ l) >
¸ly + (1¡ l)
l + (1¡ l)
which is satis¯ed because of y¤(1) > y and 1 > y¤¤(1). Thus there exists some y¤¤(2) 2
(y; y¤¤(1)) such that the left hand side of (A10) is equal to its right hand side at
yt+1 = yt = y¤¤(2). Thus (A10) implies that yt · y¤¤(2) holds for all large t.
We have thus shown that y¤(2) · yt · y¤¤(2) holds for all large enough t.
Repeating this process, we can ¯nd a sequence fy¤(m); y¤¤(m)g1m=0 such that
y¤(m) < y¤¤(m), where y¤(0) = y and y¤¤(0) = 1, and
¸ly¤¤(m¡ 1) + (1¡ l)
l(y¤(m¡ 1))® + (1¡ l)
±f(y¤(m))® ¡ ¸®y¤(m)¡ (1¡ ®)g
¸ly¤(m) + (1¡ l) =
¸®y¤(m)
l(y¤(m))® + (1¡ l)
(A11)
and
¸ly¤(m¡ 1) + (1¡ l)
l(y¤¤(m¡ 1))® + (1¡ l)
±f(y¤¤(m))® ¡ ¸®y¤¤(m)¡ (1¡ ®)g
¸ly¤¤(m) + (1¡ l) =
¸®y¤¤(m)
l(y¤¤(m))® + (1¡ l)
(A12)
for each m = 1; 2; ::: Here, y¤(m) · y¤(m + 1) while y¤¤(m + 1) · y¤¤(m) for each
m ¸ 1. Then, for each m ¸ 1, there exists some T (m) such that y¤(m) · yt · y¤¤(m)
holds for all t ¸ T (m).
We now de¯ne the limit point of (y¤(m); y¤¤(m)), denoted by (y¤; y¤¤), satisfying
(A11) and (A12) at y¤(m) = y¤(m¡ 1) = y¤ and y¤¤(m¡ 1) = y¤¤(m) = y¤¤:
¸ly¤¤ + (1¡ l)
¸ly¤ + (1¡ l) ±f(y
¤)® ¡ ¸®y¤ ¡ (1¡ ®)g = ¸®y¤ (A13)
and
¸ly¤ + (1¡ l)
¸ly¤¤ + (1¡ l)±f(y
¤¤)® ¡ ¸®y¤¤ ¡ (1¡ ®)g = ¸®y¤¤: (A14)
Here, note that, since y¤(m) is increasing and bounded above, the sequence fy¤(m)g
converges to y¤. Also, note that, since y¤¤(m) is decreasing and bounded below, the
sequence fy¤¤(m)g converges to y¤¤.
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Let S ´ f(y¤; y¤¤) 2 [y; 1=¸]2 j (A13) and (A14) are satis¯ed.g. Then S 6= ; be-
cause the steady state of the economy (~y; ~y) satis¯es (A13) and (A14) by its de¯nition.
Now we show that limt!1 yt 2 [y¤; y¤¤] for any (y¤; y¤¤) 2 S. Take any (y¤; y¤¤) 2 S.
Take also any " > 0. Then, since (y¤(m); y¤¤(m)) is convergent, there exists some large
m00 such that y¤ ¡ y¤(m00) · " and y¤¤(m00) ¡ y¤¤ · ". For such m00, we can ¯nd a
large T (m00) such that for all t ¸ T (m00), y¤(m00) · yt · y¤¤(m00), which implies that
y¤ ¡ " · yt · y¤¤ + ". Since " > 0 is arbitrary, we have limt!1 yt 2 [y¤; y¤¤]. Since
(y¤; y¤¤) 2 S is arbitrary, by taking (~y; ~y) 2 S we establish that limt!1 yt = ~y. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary.
First, we consider the e®ect of ± on ~y and ~x.
We can see from (15) that
@~y
@±
= ¡ ~y
® ¡ ¸®~y ¡ (1¡ ®)
±®(~y®¡1 ¡ ¸)¡ ¸® < 0
because ~y is the smallest root to (15) and thus the denominator is positive.
Next we de¯ne
½(y) ´ ly
® + (1¡ l)
¸ly + (1¡ l)
where we verify that ½0 has the same sign as ¸ly®(®¡ 1)+ (1¡ l)(®y®¡1¡ ¸) and that
½00 < 0 at any y satisfying ½0(y) = 0. Thus ½ is strictly quasi-concave function. Also
½0(0) = +1 and ½0(1) ¸ 0 if and only if ¸ · ®(1 ¡ l)=(l(1 ¡ ®) + (1 ¡ l)) as we have
assumed. Thus ½0 > 0 for all y 2 [0; 1] under our assumption.
Then, we can show from (16) that @~x=@± < 0 because the increase in ± reduces ~y.
Second, we consider the e®ect of ¸. We can readily see from (15) that
@~y
@¸
=
®~y + ±®~y
±®(~y®¡1 ¡ ¸)¡ ¸® > 0
Also, from (16) we have ~x = [¸(1¡ ®)A½(~y)]1=(1¡®). Then we can compute that
d~x
d¸
=
@~x
@¸
+
@~x
@~y
@~y
@¸
> 0
where @~x=@¸ has the same sign as @=@¸(¸=(¸l~y + (1 ¡ l))) > 0, @~x=@y > 0 if ¸ ·
®(1¡ l)=(l(1¡ ®) + (1¡ l)), and @~y=@¸ > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Fix any equilibrium path. In the equilibrium each relationship pair matched in period
s agrees to a sequence of relational contracts fzst (°); Rst (°); dst (°)gt¸s from period s on-
ward and its t-th generation implements the corresponding agreement fzst (°); Rst (°); dst (°)g
for the realization of exogenous separation shock ° 2 ¡ in period t.
We de¯ne by lt ´
Pt
s=0 l
s
t the total measure of the relationship pairs of young
R-producers and young R-lenders in period t whose parents were not separated in the
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previous period. Thus there are 1 ¡ lt remaining young R-producers (or young R-
lenders) who engage in arm's length contracts in the credit market in period t. Then
we can derive the law of motion governing the process of lt. Since lt is the sum of
all the relationships with di®erent birth dates (0 · s · t) which are not dissolved in
period t, we have lt =
Pt
s=0 l
s
t . Here l
s
t =
P
i q
i°ilst¡1 for t ¸ s + 1 is the measure of
the relationships which have been carried over from period s and ltt is the measure of
newly matched relationships in period t. In the beginning of period t there are 1¡ lt¡1
old A-producers and 1 ¡ lt¡1 old A-lenders who engaged in arm's length contracts in
the credit market and
P
i q
i(1 ¡ °i)lt¡1 relationships are exogenously separated. All
these old producers and lenders enter the matching market in period t for ¯nding
the new partners for their children. Since each old producer (respectively, lender) is
matched with an old lender (respectively, producer) with probability m 2 (0; 1) in the
matching market, ltt = m(1¡ lt¡1 +
P
i q
i(1¡ °i)lt¡1) relationships of old R-producers
and old R-lenders are newly matched in period t. Their children will start the new
relationships from period t. Then, by using the fact that lt¡1 =
Pt¡1
s=0 l
s
t¡1, we obtain
¹lt¡1 =
Pt¡1
s=0 ¹l
s
t¡1 =
Pt¡1
s=0 l
s
t because l
s
t = ¹l
s
t¡1. Thus, we can derive
lt =
t¡1X
s=0
lst + l
t
t
= ¹lt¡1 + ltt
= ¹lt¡1 +m(1¡ ¹lt¡1)
= m+ (1¡m)¹lt¡1
which converges to a unique steady state l¤ ´ m1¡(1¡m)¹ . Then we de¯ne l ´ maxfl0; l¤g,
which implies that lt · l for all t.
Next, we derive the necessary conditions for equilibrium relational contract to be
sustainable. Take a relationship pair of a young R-producer and a young R-lender
matched in period s who agree on a sequence of relational contracts fzst (°); Rst (°); dst (°)gs¸t
from period s onward. Here, recall that dst (°) 2 f0; 1g and that dst (°) = 1 holds when
they implement the period t-relational contract (zst (°); R
s
t (°)) and d
s
t (°) = 0 holds
when they decide to go to the outside credit market respectively.30 Let ¡st ´ f° 2
¡ j dst (°) = 1g be the set of the exogenous separation shocks which induce the imple-
mentation of the relational contract in period t instead of going to the outside credit
market.
We de¯ne by
usp;t(°) ´ ptzst (°)¡Rst (°)¡ rtmax[zst (°)¡ wt¡1; 0];
the pro¯t of an old R-producer in period t when dst (°) = 1 where the term rtmax[z
s
t (°)¡
wt¡1; 0] re°ects the case that the R-producer invests zst (°) more than wt¡1 owned by
30In any equilibrium any R-producer and R-lender never voluntarily dissolve their relationship as we
will see below.
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the R-lender, in which case he must borrow the extra amount zst (°) ¡ wt¡1 from the
outside credit market. Also, we de¯ne by
usl;t(°) ´ Rst (°) + ¸rtmax[wt¡1 ¡ zst (°); 0]
the pro¯t of an old R-lender in period t when dst (°) = 1 where the term ¸rtmax[wt¡1¡
zst (°); 0] re°ects the case that the young R-lender lends the remaining amount wt¡1 ¡
zst (°) to the credit market after making the relationship lending z
s
t (°) to the young
R-producer. Then we also de¯ne by
V sp;t ´
nX
i=1
qifdst (°i)usp;t(°i) + (1¡ dst (°i))¼tg
and
V sl;t ´
nX
i=1
qifdst (°i)usl;t(°i) + (1¡ dst (°i))¸rtwt¡1g
the expected pro¯ts of an old R-producer and an old R-lender respectively.
Suppose that ° 2 ¡st is realized where dst (°) = 1. Then, by following the agreed
upon relational contract, the old R-producer obtains the following payo®:
U sp;t(°) ´ usp;t(°) + °±V sp;t+1 + (1¡ °)±fmV t+1p;t+1 + (1¡m)¼t+1g
when facing the separation shock ° 2 ¡ in period t. With probability °, the relationship
continues to the next period in which case his child will obtain the expected pro¯t V sp;t+1.
With probability 1¡ °, the relationship is exogenously separated in which case the old
R-producer go to the matching market for seeking a di®erent old lender. Then, with
probability m, match is successful so that his child can start a new relationship and
obtain the expected pro¯t V t+1p;t+1 while with probability 1¡m match is not successful
so that his child has nothing but to go to the outside credit market and earn the arm's
length contract pro¯t ¼t+1.
On the other hand, if the old R-producer reneged on the repayment Rst (°) and
quitted the relationship (and then went to the matching market) in period t, he would
obtain the following deviation payo®:
~U tp;t(°) ´ ptzst (°)¡ rtmax[zst (°)¡ wt¡1; 0] + ±fmV t+1p;t+1 + (1¡m)¼t+1g:
Thus, the following incentive compatibility constraint must be satis¯ed:
U sp;t(°) ¸ ~U sp;t(°) (ICst (°))
Second, for any ° 2 ¡, the young R-producer must be not better o® by quitting the
relationship, which yields the pro¯t ¼t, and going to the matching market for seeking
a new lender when old, which yields the expected pro¯t mV t+1p;t+1 + (1 ¡m)¼t+1 to his
child. This individual rationality constraint is given by
dst (°)u
s
p;t(°) + (1¡ dst (°))¼t ¸ ¼t + ±fmV t+1p;t+1 + (1¡m)¼t+1g (IRPst (°))
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where the left hand side denotes the pro¯t of the young R-producer who obtains usp;t(°)
for ° 2 ¡st but ¼t for ° =2 ¡st .
Third, a similar individual rationality constraint for the young R-lender must be
satis¯ed: for all ° 2 ¡,
dst (°)u
s
l;t(°)+ (1¡ dst (°))¸rtwt¡1 ¸ ¸rtwt¡1+ ±fmV t+1l;t+1+(1¡m)¸rt+1wtg (IRLst (°))
By combining ICst (°) with IRL
s
t (°) for ° 2 ¡st (thus dst (°) = 1), we obtain the
modi¯ed incentive compatibility condition:
°±fJst+1 ¡mJ t+1t+1 ¡ (1¡m)(¸rt+1wt + ¼t+1)g ¸ ¸rtmin[zst (°)¡ wt¡1; 0] + ¸rtwt¡1
(A-ICst (°))
where Jst+1 ´ V sp;t+1 + V sl;t+1.
Also, by combining IRLst (°) with IRP
s
t (°) for any ° 2 ¡ (thus any dst (°) 2 f0; 1g),
the total net surplus of relationship must be non-negative:
TSst (°) ´ dst (°)(usp;t(°) + usl;t(°)) + (1¡ dst (°))(¸rtwt¡1 + ¼t)¡ (¸rtwt¡1 + ¼t)
+ °±fJst+1 ¡mJ t+1t+1 ¡ (1¡m)(¸rt+1wt + ¼t+1)g
¸ 0 (TSst (°))
Note that the young R-producer (respectively, the young R-lender) obtains his
(her) expected payo® of period t, which takes into account his (her) concern about
the child's consumption in period t + 1, as V sp;t + ¹±V
s
p;t+1 + (1 ¡ ¹)fmV t+1p;t+1 + (1 ¡
m)¼t+1g (respectively, V sl;t + ¹±V sl;t+1 + (1 ¡ ¹)fmV t+1l;t+1 + (1 ¡ m)¸rt+1wtg). Let ~V st
be the sum of these expected payo®s. Then, as in the basic model, we suppose that
each relationship pair formed in period s chooses a sequence of relational contracts
fzst (°); Rst (°); dst (°)gt¸s from period s onward in order to maximize the weighted sum
of the expected payo®s in the future generations of the same dynasty, Ws = ~V ss +
¹¯Ws+1+(1¡¹)¯£Constant where the last term Constant denotes the future payo®
attained when the relationship is separated, which is not a®ected by the choice of
relational contracts fzst (°); Rst (°); dst (°)gt¸s by the relationship formed in period s and
hence we can ignore it. Here, some remarks on the set of constraints are in order. First,
as we have noted, any young R-producer and any young R-lender of any relationship
never fully dissolve their relationship in which case they must engage in arm's length
contract and go to the matching market for seeking another partners when old. This
is because they can always attain the same payo®s under full dissolution by using
a relational contract without dissolution.31 Second, TSst (°) can be always satis¯ed
31Suppose that they dissolve relationship for some ° 2 ¡ in period t (thus going to the credit market
when young in period t and going to the matching market when old in period t + 1). Then, the
R-producer (respectively, R-lender) obtains ¼t + ±fmV t+1p;t+1 + (1 ¡ m)¼t+1g (respectively, ¸rtwt¡1 +
±fmV t+1l;t+1+(1¡m)¸rt+1wtg). However, they can always attain at least these payo®s without dissolving
the relationship by using a relational contract which speci¯es dst (°) = 0 and mimics the equilibrium
contract used by the relationship matched in period t + 1, fzt+1¿ (°); Rt+1¿ (°); dt+1¿ (°)g¿¸t+1 if Jt+1t+1 ¸
¸rt+1wt + ¼t+1 and d
s
t+1(°) = 0 (i.e., going to the outside credit market) otherwise.
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because dst (°) = 1 should be chosen only when u
s
p;t(°) + u
s
l;t(°) ¸ ¸rtwt¡1 + ¼t. Thus
we consider only A-ICst (°) for ° 2 ¡st as the relevant constraint.
Finally, the credit market and labour market equilibrium conditions are modi¯ed
as follows:
¸(1¡ lt)wt + ¸
tX
s=0
ÃX
i
qidst (°
i)lst max[wt ¡ zst+1(°i); 0] +
X
i
qi(1¡ dst (°i))lstwt
!
= (1¡ lt)xt+1 +
tX
s=0
ÃX
i
qidst (°
i)lst max[z
s
t+1(°
i)¡ wt; 0] +
X
i
qi(1¡ dst (°i))lstxt+1
!
(A-CMEt)
and
wt = (1¡ ®)A
Ã
(1¡ lt¡1)x®t +
t¡1X
s=0
ÃX
i
qidst¡1(°
i)lst¡1z
s
t (°
i)® +
X
i
qi(1¡ dst¡1(°i))lst¡1x®t
!!
(A-LMEt)
Here the left hand side of A-CMEt is the total credit supply while its right hand side
is the total credit demand in the credit market. There are (1 ¡ lt) young A-lenders
(respectively, A-producers) who supply wt each (respectively, demand xt+1 each) while
R-lenders (respectively, R-producers) who implement the relational contracts supply
the credit of max[wt¡zst+1(°); 0] each (respectively, demand max[zst+1(°)¡wt; 0] each).
All other R-lenders (respectively, R-producers) behave as A-lenders (respectively, A-
producers) do so, i.e., R-lenders (respectively, R-producers) lend (respectively, borrow)
all their wage income wt (respectively, the investment demand xt+1).
Then, by using A-ICst (°), A-CMEt and A-LMEt together, we can show the following
claims (the formal proofs are given in Online Appendix).
Lemma A1. Suppose that ¸ · 1 ¡ l. Then wt ¸ zst+1(°) for all s, all t ¸ s and all
° 2 ¡st .
Lemma A2. Suppose that ¸ · 1 ¡ l. Then, zst (°) · (1=¸)xt for all ° 2 ¡st so that
A-ICst (°) always binds for ° 2 ¡st .
Lemma A3. (i) If dst (°) = 1, then d
s
t (°
0) = 1 for all °0 > °. (ii) Suppose that
± > ¸®(1¡®)(1¡m) . Then, d
s
t (°
n) = 1 must be satis¯ed for all t ¸ T for some period T ¸ s
Lemma A4. In any equilibrium pathµ
xt+1
xt
¶
¸ ¸(1¡ ®)A(1¡ l)x®¡1t
and xt · maxfx0; Xg for all t ¸ 0 where
X ´ ¸
µ
(1¡ ®)A
1¡ l
¶ 1
1¡®
:
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Lemma A1 shows that any R-producer never invests more than the fund owned by
the R-lender matching him as we have seen in Lemma 2. Thus A-ICst (°) is simpli¯ed
to the condition derived in the main text:
°±fJst+1 ¡mJ t+1t+1 ¡ (1¡m)(¸rt+1wt + ¼t+1)g ¸ ¸rtzst (°) (A-ICst (°))
where Jst+1 =
P
i q
imax[pt+1zst+1(°
i)¡¸rt+1zst+1(°i); ¼t+1] by optimal choice of dst+1(°) 2
f0; 1g. Lemma A2 states that such A-ICst (°) becomes always binding for ° 2 ¡st which
implies that yst (°
i)=°i = yst (°
j)=°j for all °i; °j 2 ¡st . Then, it follows from Lemma
A2 that zst (°)=xt · 1=¸ for all ° 2 ¡st . In addition, by using rt = ®2Ax®¡1t , we have
ptz
s
t (°) ¡ ¸rtzst (°) · ®Ax®t f¸¡® ¡ ®g. This shows that J tt · ®Axt(¸¡® ¡ ®) due to
¸¡® ¡ ® > 1 ¡ ®. Lemma A3 (i) says that the relationships facing lower separation
probability (higher °) implement the relational contracts more likely than those facing
higher separation probability. Lemma A3 (ii) also shows that every relationship even-
tually implements the relational contract when facing the least severe separation shock
°n = 1. Finally, Lemma A4 states that the output growth rate of A-producers xt+1=xt
is bounded below and that the output level of each A-producer xt is bounded above.
Now we assume that ¸ · ¸00 where ± = ¸00®=(1¡m)(1¡ ®).
By Lemma A3, dst (°
n) = 1 for all t ¸ for some period T ¸ s. This implies that
A-ICst (°
n) is satis¯ed for all t ¸ T and that ¡st 6= ; for all t ¸ T . Then, due to Lemma
A2, A-ICst (°) must hold as equality for all ° 2 ¡st for all t ¸ T .
Recall that J t+1t+1 · ®Ax®t+1(¸¡® ¡ ®), ¼t = ®A(1¡ ®)x®t and rt = ®2Ax®¡1t . Then,
by using the fact that A-ICst (°) binds for all ° 2 ¡st and all t ¸ T for some T ¸ s, we
obtain
±
µ
xt+1
xt
¶®
fJst+1 ¡m(¸¡® ¡ ®)¡ (1¡m)(1¡ ®)g · ¸®zst (°)=°
for all ° 2 ¡st and all t ¸ T . Note that Jst+1 =
P
i q
imax[®Azst+1(°
i)®¡¸rt+1zst+1(°i); ¼t+1]
and zst+1(°
i)=°i = zst+1(°
j)=°j for i 6= j. De¯ne ~yt ´ zst (°)=° for all ° 2 ¡st where
~yt · 1=¸ by Lemma A2. Here we omit superscript s from ~yt to denote the birth date of
a relationship becasue our result can be applied to any relationship which starts from
any period.
Then, the above inequality can be written by
¸®~yt ¸ ±[¸(1¡ ®)A(1¡ l)(maxfx0; Xg)®¡1]®
£
(X
i
qimax[(°i)®~y®t+1 ¡ ¸®~yt+1; 1¡ ®]¡m(¸¡® ¡ ®)¡ (1¡m)(1¡ ®)
)
:
(A15)
LetK(~yt+1) be the right hand side of A15 which is a function of ~yt+1 2 [0; 1=¸]. Then we
can readily verify thatK(1=¸) ¸ ±[¸(1¡®)A(maxfx0; Xg)®¡1]®f(qn¡m)(¸¡®¡1)g > 0
due to qn > m and hence that there exists some ¸0 2 (0; 1) such that K(1=¸) > ®¸
45
holds for all ¸ 2 (0; ¸0). Then de¯ne ¸ ´ minf¸00; ¸0; 1 ¡ lg and let ¸ 2 (0; ¸). Thus,
Lemma A1-A3 can be applied for all ¸ 2 (0; ¸) as well as K(1=¸) > ®¸. Then, since
K(0) < 0 and K(1=¸) > ®¸ for ¸ 2 (0; ¸), there exists some y^ 2 (0; 1=¸) such that
K(y^) = ¸®y^. If ~yt > y^, ~yt decreases over time according to A15 and eventually ~yt · y^
holds.
Also, we can de¯ne yi 2 [0; 1=¸], i = 1; 2; :::; n, such that fi(y) ´ (°i)®y®¡°i¸®y =
1 ¡ ® as long as fi(1=¸) > 1 ¡ ®. Since fi(y) > fj(y) for all i > j, yi < yj for all
i > j. Let I ´ fi = 1; 2; :::; n j fi(1=¸) ¸ 1¡ ®g. Then we can verify that for all i 2 I,
fi(y) ¸ 1 ¡ ® if and only if y 2 [yi; 1=¸]. On the other hand, fi(y) < 1 ¡ ® for all
y 2 [0; 1=¸] for all i =2 I. Then de¯ne k such that yk¡1 ¸ y^ ¸ yk (de¯ne k = 1 if y^ < yn
and k = n if y^ > y1).
Then, we can ¯nd some period T s(°i) ¸ T for i ¸ k¡ 1 such that ~yt decreases over
time when ~yt > y^ according to the dynamic constraint A15 and eventually ~yt · yi for
all t ¸ T s(°i) so that dst (°i) = 0 for all t ¸ T s(°i). Since yi > yj for all i < j, we have
T s(°j) · T s(°j) for i > j where k ¡ 1 ¸ i > j. If ~yt < y^ for all t ¸ s, then de¯ne
T s(°i) = s for all i · k ¡ 1.
Finally, we show that yt(°i) decreases over time whenever yt(°i) > y^. By the above
result, we know that K(~yt) · ¸®~yt for all ~yt > y^ which implies that ~yt decreases over
time as long as ~yt > y^. This gives the desired result. Q.E.D.
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Online Appendix (Not for Publication)
Appendix B: Equilibrium capital investment by A-producers
In the main text we have so far assumed that each young A-producer born in period
t¡ 1 chooses a capital investment xt so as to maximize only his own pro¯t ¼t. Because
the utility function of each A-producer depends on his child's consumption level, one
might think that there may be intergenerational strategic interactions between an A-
producer's choice of capital investment xt and his child's capital investment choice xt+1.
However, the following claim shows that it is su±cient to focus only on the equilibrium
in which each A-producer acts to maximize only his own pro¯t ¼t no matter what
histories are observed.
Suppose that each young A-producer in each dynasty, born in period t, can observe
all the capital investments fx1; x2; :::; xt¡1g chosen in the same dynasty and all the
market prices fw0; :::; wt¡1; r1; :::; rt¡1; p0; :::; pt¡1g in the past periods. Then we let ht
be such a history observed up to period t. Let Ht be also the set of all these histories
observed to a young A-producer up to period t.
Proposition B1. In any equilibrium, every A-producer born in period t ¡ 1 chooses
capital investment level xt to maximize only his own pro¯t ¼t no matter the history
observed up to period t.
Proof. Take an equilibrium path in which each A-producer uses a strategy ¾t : Ht !
[0;1) which maps from, Ht, the set of all previous observed histories up to period t to
the current capital investment level xt ¸ 0.
Then, by recalling that x(rt) maximizes the per period pro¯t ¼t of an A-producer,
we will show that every A-producer acts to maximize his own pro¯t ¼t and hence chooses
xt = x(rt) in every period irrespective of observed histories ht 2 Ht. We denote by ¾t
such strategy de¯ned as ¾(ht) = x(rt) for all ht 2 Ht.
To show this, suppose that there exists an equilibrium with ¾t 6= ¾t for some A-
producer in some period t. Thus ¾(ht) 6= x(rt) for some ht 2 Ht. We then denote by
fxsg1s=t the equilibrium sequence of capital investments of A-producers from period t
onward according to the equilibrium strategies f¾sg1s=t.
In the proof of the claim, we will denote by ¼(xt) the pro¯t of an A-producer who
chooses xt in period t.
Since the A-producer could always choose x(rt) in period t, it must be the case that
¼(xt) + ±¼(xt+1) ¸ ¼(x(rt)) + ±¼(x0t+1)
where his child will choose x0t+1 in period t+ 1 following the choice of his parent x(rt)
according to his equilibrium strategy ¾t+1. The above inequality yields
±f¼(xt+1)¡ ¼(x0t+1)g ¸ ¼(x(rt))¡ ¼(xt): (B1)
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Also, for x0t+1 to be the optimal choice by the young A-producer in period t+1 following
x(rt) chosen by his parent, we must have
¼(x0t+1) + ±¼(x
00
t+2) ¸ ¼(x(rt+1)) + ±¼(x0t+2)
because he could always choose x(rt+1) following his parent choice x(rt) where x00t+2
denotes the choice of his child in period t+2 following x0t+1. Here x0t+2 is the choice in
period t+ 2 following x(rt+1). This then yields
±f¼(x00t+2)¡ ¼(x0t+2)g ¸ ¼(x(rt+1))¡ ¼(x0t+1):
Since ¼(x(rt+1)) ¸ ¼(xt+1) for any xt+1 6= x(rt+1), we have
±f¼(x00t+2)¡ ¼(x0t+2)g ¸ ¼(xt+1)¡ ¼(x0t+1): (B2)
Combining inequalities (B1) with (B2), we have
±2f¼(x00t+2)¡ ¼(x0t+2)g ¸ ¼(x(rt))¡ ¼(xt): (B3)
In period t + 2 the young A-producer in the dynasty in question must choose x0t+2
following the choice x(rt+1) by his parent in period t+ 1. Thus, since he could always
choose x00t+2 instead of x0t+2 in period t+ 2, we must have
¼(x0t+2) + ±¼(x
00
t+3) ¸ ¼(x00t+2) + ±¼(x0t+3)
where x00t+3 and x0t+3 denote the choices by the A-producer in period t + 3 following
x0t+2 and x00t+2 respectively. Thus
±f¼(x00t+3)¡ ¼(x0t+3)g ¸ ¼(x00t+2)¡ ¼(x0t+2)
Combining this with (B3), we have
±3f¼(x00t+3)¡ ¼(x0t+3)g ¸ ¼(x(rt))¡ ¼(xt)
Repeating this argument for all periods s+ t ¸ t, we obtain
±sf¼(x00t+s)¡ ¼(x0t+s)g ¸ ¼(x(rt))¡ ¼(xt); 8 s ¸ 0:
Since ¼(x(rt)) 6= ¼(xt) by our supposition (¾(ht) = xt 6= x(rt)), there exists some
" > 0 such that ¼(x(rt)) ¡ ¼(xt) ¸ ". The left hand side of the above inequality
is bounded above by ±s¼(x(rt+s)) because ¼(xt+s) ¸ 0 and ¼(x(rt+s)) = maxx ¼(x)
given rt+s. Note here that ¼(xt+s) ¸ 0 because, by the spot transaction nature of
arm's length contract in the credit market, each A-producer must make the repayment
rt+sxt+s from what he earns pt+sxt+s when he is old.
Then, if ¼(x(rt+s)) is bounded above, the left hand side of the above inequality
goes to zero by letting s ! 1 and noting ± < 1, which is a contradiction. Thus it
su±ces to show that ¼(x(rt)) < +1 for any equilibrium interest rate rt ¸ 0. This is
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equivalent to the condition that rt ¸ r for all t for some r > 0 because then ¼(x(r)) ·
maxx ®(Ax)® ¡ rx < +1. Suppose that rt = 0 for some period t or rt ! 0. In either
case x(rt) must go to in¯nity. Since ¼(xt) + ±¼(xt+1) ¸ ¼(x(rt)) + ±¼(x0t+1) must hold
in period t (see (B1) above), either ¼(xt)!1 or ¼(xt+1)!1 or both must hold due
to ¼(x(rt))!1 and ¼(x0t+1) ¸ 0, which implies xt !1 or xt+1 !1 with rt+1 = 0.
In the former case (xt !1) CMEt¡1 must imply ¸wt¡1 = ¸lzt+(1¡ l)xt !1, which
holds only when wt¡1 ! 1 so that xt¡1 ! 1 or zt¡1 ! 1. We can deal with the
latter case xt+1 !1 in a similar way. However, then wt¡2 !1 by CMEt¡2 in period
t¡ 1. Repeating this, w0 !1 which is however impossible. Thus rt ¸ r must hold in
any period t for some r > 0. This then establishes the claim. Q.E.D.
Appendix C: Proofs for Lemma A1-A4
In this subsection we will give the proofs for Lemma A1-A4 which are used to prove
Proposition 5 in the main text.
Lemma A1. Suppose that ¸ · 1 ¡ l. Then wt ¸ zst+1(°) for all s, all t ¸ s and all
° 2 ¡st .
Proof. Suppose contrary to the claim that zst (°) > wt¡1 for some period t and some ° 2
¡st . Then, the relationship's joint pro¯t of period t becomes ptz
s
t (°)¡ rt(zst (°)¡wt¡1).
Also the right hand side of A-ICst (°) must be ¸rtwt¡1 which is independent of zst (°).
Thus the choice of zst (°) does not a®ect A-IC
s
t (°) but changing z
s
t (°) slightly toward xt
can increase the joint pro¯t of period t, ptzst (°)¡rt(zst (°)¡wt¡1), as long as zst (°) 6= xt.
Thus zst (°) = xt must hold. On the other hand, A-CMEt¡1 can be written by
¸(1¡ lt¡1)wt¡1 + SRt¡1 = (1¡ lt¡1)xt +DRt
where
SRt ´ ¸
t¡1X
s=0
ÃX
i
qilst¡1[d
s
t¡1(°
i)max[wt¡1 ¡ zst (°i); 0] + (1¡ dst¡1(°i))wt¡1]
)
and
DRt ´
t¡1X
s=0
(X
i
qi[dst¡1(°
i)max[zst (°
i)¡ wt¡1; 0] + (1¡ dst¡1(°i))xt]
)
:
Since SRt¡1 · ¸lt¡1wt¡1 and DRt ¸ 0, A-CMEt¡1 implies that ¸wt¡1 ¸ (1 ¡ lt¡1)xt.
Since lt · l for all t, ¸wt¡1 ¸ (1 ¡ l)xt. But, by assumption that ¸ · 1 ¡ l, we have
¸wt¡1 ¸ (1 ¡ l)xt ¸ ¸xt which shows that wt¡1 ¸ xt, contradicting to zst (°) = xt >
wt¡1. Q.E.D.
Lemma A2. Suppose that ¸ · 1 ¡ l. Then, zst (°) · (1=¸)xt for all ° 2 ¡st so that
A-ICst (°) always binds for all ° 2 ¡st .
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Proof. Suppose that A-ICst (°) is not binding for some period t and some ° 2 ¡st .
Lemma A1 shows that wt¡1 ¸ zst (°) holds for all ° 2 ¡st and for all t ¸ s. Then the
relationship's joint pro¯t of period t becomes ptzst (°) ¡ ¸rt(zt(°) ¡ wt¡1) for such °.
This pro¯t is maximized at zst (°) = ^¸xt. Thus, as long as A-IC
s
t (°) is slack for some
° at t, zst (°) = ^¸xt must hold by the optimality of relational contract: otherwise, a
slight change of zst (°) toward ^¸xt can increase the joint pro¯t without violating all the
constraints.
Due to Lemma A1, A-CMEt¡1 can be written by
¸(1¡ lt¡1)wt¡1 + ¸
t¡1X
s=0
X
i
qidst¡1(°
i)lst¡1(wt¡1 ¡ zst (°i))
+
t¡1X
s=0
X
i
qi(1¡ dst¡1(°i))lst¡1(¸wt¡1 ¡ xt)
= (1¡ lt¡1)xt
Now we show that xt ¸ ¸wt¡1. Suppose not. Then, the left hand side of the above
A-CMEt¡1 cannot be less than ¸(1 ¡ lt¡1)wt¡1 so that ¸(1 ¡ lt¡1)wt¡1 · (1 ¡ lt¡1)xt
must hold, implying that xt ¸ ¸wt¡1, a contradiction. Thus xt ¸ ¸wt¡1 must hold.
But then (1=¸)xt ¸ wt¡1 ¸ zst (°) which shows that ^¸xt ¸ (1=¸)xt > zst (°) = ^¸xt, a
contraction. Q.E.D.
Lemma A3. (i) If dst (°) = 1, then d
s
t (°
0) = 1 for all °0 > °. (ii) Suppose that
± > ¸®(1¡®)(1¡m) . Then, d
s
t (°
n) = 1 must be satis¯ed for all t ¸ T for some period T ¸ s
Proof. (i) Suppose that dst (°
0) = 1 but dst (°00) = 0 for some °00 > °0 in some period
t. Then, modify the original equilibrium contract only for such period t and °00 as
~dst (°
00) = 1 and ~zst (°00) = zst (°0) + " for " ¸ 0. Note that dst (°0) = 1 implies that
ptz
s
t (°
0) ¡ ¸rtzst (°0) ¸ ¼t > 0. Thus zst (°0) > 0 and hence A-ICst (°0) implies that
Jst+1¡mJ t+1t+1 ¡ (1¡m)(¸rt+1wt+¼t+1) > 0. Then, since A-ICst (°0) holds and °00 > °0,
we can see that °00±fJst+1 ¡mJ t+1t+1 ¡ (1¡m)(¸rt+1wt + ¼t+1)g > °0±fJst+1 ¡mJ t+1t+1 ¡
(1 ¡ m)(¸rt+1wt + ¼t+1)g ¸ ¸rtzst (°0). Thus A-ICst (°00) can be slack at ~zst (°00) for a
small enough " ¸ 0.
Case 1: wt¡1 > zst (°0). Then, take " > 0 that satis¯es ~zst (°00) · wt¡1. Thus ~zst (°00) >
zst (°
0). But, then we obtain
pt~zst (°
00) + ¸rt(wt¡1 ¡ ~zst (°00)) > ptzst (°0) + ¸rt(wt¡1 ¡ zst (°0))
¸ ¸rtwt¡1 + ¼t
where the ¯rst inequality follows from that zst (°
0) < ^¸xt and ptzt ¡ ¸rtzt is increasing
in zt · ^¸xt, and the second inequality from dst (°0) = 1. This shows that the modi¯ed
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contract can improve the joint surplus of period t, a contradiction to dst (°
00) = 0.
Case 2: wt¡1 = zst (°0). Then, ~zst (°00) = wt¡1 + " ¸ wt¡1 for " ¸ 0 in which case the
joint pro¯t of period t becomes
©t(") ´ pt~zst (°00) + rt(wt¡1 ¡ ~zst (°00))
= pt(wt¡1 + ")¡ rt"
= ®A(wt¡1 + ")® ¡ rt"
where ©t(0) = ptwt¡1 ¸ ¸rtwt¡1+¼t due to dst (°0) = 1. Thus, if ptwt¡1 > ¸rtwt¡1+¼t,
then we set " = 0 which shows that the joint surplus of period t, ©t(0), can be positive.
Next, suppose that ptwt¡1 = ¸rtwt¡1+¼t which is re-written by ptwt¡1¡¸rtwt¡1 = ¼t
so that ®Aw®t¡1 ¡ ¸rtwt¡1 = ¼t ´ maxz ®Az® ¡ rtz. This implies that wt¡1 < xt
because xt maximizes ®Ax® ¡ rtx over x ¸ 0. However, then ©0t(0) = ®2Aw®¡1t¡1 ¡ rt =
®2A[w®¡1t¡1 ¡ x®¡1t ] > 0. We can thus set a small enough " > 0 yielding a posituve joint
surplus of period t, ©t(0) > 0, contradicting to dst (°
00) = 0 again.
(ii) Suppose that ± > ¸®(1¡m)(1¡®) .
Suppose contrary to the claim that dst (°
n) = 0 for all t ¸ s for some period s. Then,
by above (i), dst (°) = 0 for all ° 2 ¡ for all t ¸ s. Then, we will show that this cannot
be an equilibrium becasue there are the deviation contracts which are pro¯table for
some relationships.
Case 1: ptz¿t (°) ¡ ¸rtz¿t (°) · ¼t for all ¿ > s, for all t ¸ ¿ and for all ° 2 ¡. Then,
J tt = ¸rtwt¡1+¼t for all t ¸ s, which implies that there exist no relationships engaging
in relational contracts at all from period s onward in all the future periods. Thus,
A-CMEt implies that ¸wt = xt+1 for all t ¸ s, which shows that xt converges to
x¤ ´ [¸(1¡ ®)A]1=(1¡®) as t ! 1. We will however show that Case 1 never happens.
If not, set a new contract o®ered at period s as follows: ~zst (°) ´ xt + " (" > 0) and
~dst (°) = 1 for all t ¸ s and for all ° satisfying ± ¸ ¸®°(1¡m)(1¡®) (such ° exists by
assumption). Set ~dst (°) = 0 for all other °. Let ~¡ ´
n
° 2 ¡ j ± ¸ ¸®°(1¡m)(1¡®)
o
. Then,
since ¸wt¡1 = xt for all t > s, we have wt¡1 > xt for all t > s. Thus ~zst (°) · wt¡1
holds for all ° 2 ~¡ if we take small enough " > 0. However, then we obtain
pt~zst (°)¡ ¸rt~zst (°) > ptxt ¡ ¸rtxt
¸ ptxt ¡ rtxt
= ¼t
for all ° 2 ~¡ where the ¯rst inequality follows from ptz ¡ ¸rtz is increasing in z < ^¸xt
and ~zst (°) = xt+". Thus the expected joint pro¯t of period t ¸ s that is attained by the
new contract becomes ~Jst ´
P
°i2~¡[pt~z
s
t (°
i)+¸rt(wt¡1¡ ~zst (°i))]+
P
°i =2~¡[¸rtwt¡1+¼t]
which can be larger than the equilibrium pro¯t ¸rtwt¡1 + ¼t for all t ¸ s. This can be
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then a pro¯table deviation if the new contract is feasible. The feasibility will be shown
for all large t ¸ s, i.e., A-ICst (°) for ° 2 ~¡ is satis¯ed for all large enough t ¸ s. To see
this, note that xt ! x¤ as t!1 and that ± ¸ ¸®°(1¡m)(1¡®) implies that, when t!1,
we have °±f ~Jst+1 ¡mJ t+1t+1 ¡ (1¡m)(¸rt+1wt + ¼t+1)g > °±(1¡m)¼t ¸ ¸rt(xt + ") for
a small enough " where note that J t+1t+1 = ¸rt+1wt + ¼t+1. Thus A-IC
s
t (°) holds for all
° 2 ¡st for all large enough t ¸ s. Thus the new contract becomes a pro¯table deviation
for all large t ¸ s.
Case 2: ¼tz¿t (°
00)¡ ¸rtz¿t (°00) > ¼t for some ¿ ¸ s, some t ¸ ¿ and some °00 2 ¡. Then,
consider the new contract in such period s by mimicking the equilibrium contract used
by the relationship pair formed in such future period ¿ > s as follows: i) dst (°) = 0
for all t where s · t · ¿ ¡ 1, ii) fz¿t (°); R¿t (°); d¿t (°)gt¸¿ where set dst (°) = 1 if
ptz
¿
t (°)¡ ¸rtz¿t (°) > ¼t and set dst (°) = 0 if ptz¿t (°)¡ ¸rtz¿t (°) · ¼t. Note that there
exist some ° 2 ¡ and some period t for which ptz¿t (°)¡ ¸rtz¿t (°) > ¼t by assumption.
However, then the above modi¯ed contract is feasible and strictly improves the joint
pro¯t in any period t whenever ptz¿t (°)¡¸rtz¿t (°) > ¼t. This is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Lemma A4. In any equilibrium pathµ
xt+1
xt
¶
¸ ¸(1¡ ®)A(1¡ l)x®¡1t
and xt · maxfx0; Xg for all t where
X ´ ¸
µ
(1¡ ®)A
1¡ l
¶ 1
1¡®
:
Proof. By using Lemma A1 (wt ¸ zst+1(°) for all ° 2 ¡st+1), A-CMEt implies that
¸wt ¸ (1¡ lt)xt+1. Then, by using A-LMEt and Lemma A2, we obtain
¸wt = ¸(1¡ ®)A
Ã
(1¡ lt¡1x®t +
t¡1X
s=0
ÃX
i
qilst¡1[d
s
t (°
i)zst (°
i)® + (1¡ dst (°i))x®t ]
!!
· ¸(1¡ ®)Ax®t
Ã
(1¡ lt¡1) +
t¡1X
s=0
ÃX
i
qilst¡1[d
s
t (°
i)(1=¸)® + (1¡ dst (°i))]
!!
· ¸(1¡ ®)Ax®t
Ã
(1¡ lt¡1 +
t¡1X
s=0
X
i
qilst¡1(1=¸)
®)
!
= ¸(1¡ ®)Ax®t ((1¡ lt¡1) + (1=¸)®lt¡1)
· ¸(1¡ ®)A(1=¸)®x®t
= ¸1¡®(1¡ ®)Ax®t
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which in turn implies that ¸1¡®(1¡ ®)Ax®t ¸ ¸wt ¸ (1¡ l)xt+1 for all t. Thus,
xt · X ´ ¸
µ
(1¡ ®)A
1¡ l
¶ 1
1¡®
for all t when x0 · X. When x0 > X, xt · x0 for all t. In either case we have
xt · maxfx0; Xg for all t.
Second, by using Lemma A1 and Lemma A2 (zst+1(°) · (1=¸)xt+1 for all ° 2 ¡st+1),
A-CMEt shows that
¸wt = ¸
tX
s=0
X
i
qidst (°
i)lst z
s
t+1(°
i) + (1¡ lt)x+1 +
tX
s=0
X
i
qi(1¡ dst (°i))lstxt+1
· ¸
tX
s=0
X
i
qilst (1=¸)xt+1 +
tX
s=0
X
i
qilstxt+1 + (1¡ lt)xt+1
= xt+1
which yields xt+1 ¸ ¸wt. Then, we obtain xt+1 ¸ ¸wt = ¸(1 ¡ ®)A(1 ¡ lt¡1)x®t ¸
¸(1¡ ®)A(1¡ l)x®t because lt · l for all t. Thus,µ
xt+1
xt
¶
¸ ¸(1¡ ®)A(1¡ l)x®¡1t :
Q.E.D.
Appendix D: Bequest transfer
In the main text we have assumed that any individual cannot give his/her child bequest
at all. We now allow each individual to bequeath his/her child when old. The intro-
duction of bequest may a®ect the analysis because the bequest can be used to ¯nance
capital investment. However, in what follows we will show that individuals have no
incentives to bequeath their children in any equilibrium when the altruistic preference
parameter ± > 0 is in some small range. Then we can show the conditions under which
the results we have already established in the main text remain true even when we
introduce the bequest technology into the basic model as long as ± is in a certain small
range.
First, consider a young A-producer born in t¡1 who receives bequest bt¡1 from his
parent and wants to invest xt in capital. Suppose also that he gives his child bequest
bt ¸ 0. Then let (xt; bt) be a choice of an A-producer born in period t¡ 1. Given this,
the pro¯t of an old A-producer is given as follows:
¼(xt; btjbt¡1) =
½
ptxt + ¸(bt¡1 ¡ xt)rt ¡ bt if bt¡1 ¸ xt
ptxt ¡ (xt ¡ bt¡1)rt ¡ bt if bt¡1 < xt (D1)
When bt¡1 ¸ xt, the bequest bt¡1 can be used for ¯nancing xt and the remaining
amount bt¡1 ¡ xt can be saved to earn ¸rt(bt¡1 ¡ xt) in the credit market. Note here
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that lending of one unit in the credit market must be accompanied with the enforcement
cost 1 ¡ ¸. When bt¡1 < xt, the A-producer needs to use the external ¯nancing and
incur the borrowing cost rt(xt ¡ bt¡1).
We suppose that each individual observes the past capital investments and bequest
transfers made in the dynasty to which he or she belongs as well as he or she observes
the past market prices. Let Ht be a set of all these histories observed to an A-producer
up to period t. A strategy of a young A-producer is then de¯ned as a mapping from
Ht the set of observed histories up to period t to capital investment level xt ¸ 0 and
bequest transfer to his child bt ¸ 0. Let ¾t = (xt; bt) : Ht ! [0;1)2 be such strategy.
We will denote by ¼(¾tjbt¡1) the pro¯t of an A-producer who uses a strategy ¾t =
(xt; bt) in period t, given the bequest bt¡1 received from his parent. Then a young A-
producer born in period t¡ 1 obtains his payo® as ¼(¾tjbt¡1)+ ±¼(¾t+1jbt) and chooses
his strategy ¾t to maximize this payo® subject to bt ¸ 0, given the previous period
choice bt¡1.
In what follows we will impose the upper bound on the market interest rate rt,
which we denote by d > 0. In order to make exposition simple, for the time being,
we will maintain the condition of rt · d in any equilibrium path. We will give more
precise conditions on the primitives of the model which ensure this restriction later.
Then we show the following result:
Proposition D1. Suppose that ± < 1=(1 + d). Then in any equilibrium every A-
producer born in period t ¡ 1 chooses ¾t = ¾t ´ (xt; 0) which gives his child no be-
quest bt = 0 and makes capital investment xt to maximize only his own current pro¯t
¼(xt; 0jbt¡1) given any bequest received from his parent bt¡1 no matter the history.
Proof. Suppose contrary to the claim that there exists an equilibrium with f¾tg1t=1 in
which some A-producer born in some period t ¡ 1 chooses ¾t 6= ¾t. For ¾t to be an
equilibrium choice, it must be that
¼(¾tjbt¡1) + ±¼(¾t+1jbt) ¸ ¼(¾tjbt¡1) + ±¼(¾0t+1j0) (D2)
where ¾0t+1 denotes the strategy chosen by the child of the A-producer who deviates
from his equilibrium play ¾t to ¾t = (xt; 0) where xt maximizes ¼(xt; 0jbt¡1).
Let ¾^t ´ (xt; 0) be the strategy de¯ned by setting bequest transfer equal to zero in
the original strategies ¾t = (xt; bt). Let also ¾^0t+1 ´ (x0t+1; 0).
Then, by using (D1), (D2) can be written by
¼(¾^tjbt¡1)¡ bt + ±f¼(¾^t+1jbt)¡ bt+1g ¸ ¼(¾tjbt¡1) + ±f¼(¾^0t+1j0)¡ b0t+1g:
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Since ¼(¾^t+1jbt) · ¼(¾^t+1j0) + rt+1bt due to ¸ < 1, the above inequality implies that
¡(1¡ ±rt+1)bt ¡ ±bt+1 ¸ f¼(¾tjbt¡1)¡ ¼(¾^tjbt¡1)g
+ ±f¼(¾^0t+1j0)¡ ¼(¾^t+1j0)g ¡ ±b0t+1
¸ f¼(¾tjbt¡1)¡ ¼(¾^tjbt¡1)g
+ ±f¼(¾^0t+1j0)¡ ¼(¾t+1j0)g ¡ ±b0t+1
= ¢t ¡ ±¢t+1 ¡ ±b0t+1
where ¢t ´ ¼(¾tjbt¡1) ¡ ¼(¾^tjbt¡1) ¸ 0 and ¢t+1 ´ ¼(¾t+1j0) ¡ ¼(¾^0t+1j0) ¸ 0. Since
¾t 6= ¾t, ¢t > 0 or/and bt > 0 must hold.
Since bt+1 ¸ 0, the above inequality implies
¡(1¡ ±rt+1)bt ¡¢t ¸ ¡±¢t+1 ¡ ±b0t+1 (D3)
For ¾0t+1 to be the strategy chosen by the child of the A-producer after the latter
chose ¾t, it must be that
¼(¾0t+1j0) + ±¼(¾00t+2jb0t+1) ¸ ¼(¾t+1j0) + ±¼(¾0t+2j0) (D4)
where ¾00t+2 and ¾0t+2 denote the strategies chosen by the child of the A-producer in
period t + 1 following ¾0t+1 and ¾t+1 respectively. Here the left hand side of (D4) is
bounded above by
¼(¾^0t+1j0)¡ b0t+1 + ±f¼(¾t+2j0) + rt+2b0t+1 ¡ b00t+2g
due to ¼(¾00t+2jb0t+1) = ¼(¾^00t+2jb0t+1)¡ b00t+2 · ¼(¾^00t+2j0) + rt+2b0t+1 ¡ b00t+2 · ¼(¾t+2j0) +
rt+2b
0
t+1 ¡ b00t+2.
Then, by a similar argument to (D3), we can show that
¡(1¡ ±rt+2)b0t+1 ¡¢t+1 ¸ ¡±¢t+2 ¡ ±b0t+2: (D5)
Similarly, for ¾0t+2 to be chosen after the deviation ¾t+1, we must have
¡(1¡ ±rt+3)b0t+2 ¡¢t+2 ¸ ¡±¢t+3 ¡ ±b0t+3 (D6)
which implies that
¡b0t+2 ¸
1
1¡ ±rt+3 f¢t+2 ¡ ±¢t+3 ¡ ±b
0
t+3g (D7)
because of 1 > ±d ¸ ±rt+3.
By applying the same condition to period t+ 4, we obtain
¡b0t+3 ¸
1
1¡ ±rt+4 f¢t+3 ¡ ±¢t+4 ¡ ±b
0
t+4g:
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Then we show that
¡¢t+3 ¡ b0t+3 ¸ ¡¢t+3 +
1
1¡ ±rt+4 f¢t+3 ¡ ±¢t+4 ¡ ±b
0
t+4g
¸ ±rt+4
1¡ ±rt+4¢t+3 ¡
±
1¡ ±rt+4 (¢t+4 + b
0
t+4)
¸ ¡ ±
1¡ ±rt+4 (¢t+4 + b
0
t+4)
due to 1 < ±rt+4 · ±d, b0t+4 ¸ 0 and ¢t+i ¸ 0, i = 3; 4. Then (D7) must imply that
¡b0t+2 ¸
1
1¡ ±rt+3
½
¢t+2 ¡ ±
2
1¡ ±rt+4 (¢t+4 + b
0
t+4)
¾
:
By substituting this into b0t+2 in (D5), using the similar argument repeatedly and noting
that rt · d for all t, we can show that
¡(1¡ ±rt+2)b0t+1 ¡¢t+1 ¸ ¡±¢t+2 ¡ ±b0t+2
¸ ¡±¢t+2 + ±1¡ ±rt+3
½
¢t+2 ¡ ±
2
1¡ ±rt+4 (¢t+4 + b
0
t+4)
¾
=
±2rt+3
1¡ ±rt+3¢t+2 ¡ ±
µ
±2
(1¡ ±rt+3)(1¡ ±rt+4)
¶
(¢t+4 + b0t+4)
¸ ¡±
µ
±
1¡ ±d
¶T
(¢t+T+1 + b0t+T+1)
for arbitrary integer T .
Since T is arbitrary and ¢s and b0s are bounded above for all s ¸ 0,32 the right hand
side converges to zero by taking T ! 1, given ±=(1 ¡ ±d) < 1 which is equivalent to
± < 1=(1+ d). Thus the right hand side of (D5) is bounded below from zero. However,
since the left hand side of (D5) is strictly negative because 1 > ±d ¸ ±rt+1 and bt > 0
or/and ¢t > 0, this is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
We also show that every A-lender has no incentives to give their children positive
bequest in any equilibrium when ± < 1=(1 + d).
Proposition D3. Suppose that ± < 1=(1 + d). Then A-lenders leave no bequest to
their children at all in any equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that ± < 1=(1 + d). Suppose also contrary to the claim of that there
exists some equilibrium in which some A-lender in some dynasty gives a positive bequest
32Note here that b0s · maxxs¸0 ¼(xs; 0j0) < +1 and ¢s · maxxs ¼(xs; 0j0) < +1.
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bt > 0 in some period t where bt 2 [0; wt]. For this to be an equilibrium choice, the
equilibrium payo® of that lender in period t
¸rt(wt¡1 + bt¡1)¡ bt + ±f¸rt+1(wt + bt)¡ bt+1g
must not be less than
¸rt(wt¡1 + bt¡1) + ±f¸rt+1wt ¡ b0t+1g
which can be obtained by o®ering no bequest b0t = 0 which is then followed by the
choice of his child b0t+1 in the next period t+ 1. This condition thus yields
¡(1¡ ±¸rt+1)bt ¡ ±bt+1 ¸ ¡±b0t+1 (D8)
For b0t+1 to be an optimal choice by the child of the deviating lender in period t+1, we
must have that
¸rt+1wt ¡ b0t+1 + ±f¸rt+2(wt+1 + b0t+1)¡ b0t+2g
¸ ¸rt+1wt + ±f¸rt+2wt+1 ¡ b00t+2g
where b0t+2 is the bequest choice by the lender in t+2 following his parent's choice b0t+1
whereas b00t+2 is the choice by the same lender following no bequest given by his parent.
This is simpli¯ed to
¡(1¡ ±¸rt+2)b0t+1 ¸ ¡±b00t+2 (D9)
By combining (D8) with (D9), we obtain
¡(1¡ ±¸rt+1)bt ¸ ¡±b0t+1
¸ ¡ ±
2
1¡ ±¸rt+2 b
00
t+2
where the ¯rst inequality follows from bt+1 ¸ 0 and the second inequality from (D9)
respectively where 1 > ±d± ¸ ±¸rt+2 due to 1=(1 + d) > ± and 1 > ¸. Repeating
the similar argument over period t + 3, the right hand side of the above inequality is
bounded below from
¡ ±
3
(1¡ ±¸rt+2)(1¡ ±¸rt+3)b
00
t+3 (D10)
Repeating this process for any period t+ T ¸ t, (D10) is bounded below from
¡ ±
T
¦T¡1i=1 (1¡ ±¸rt+i)
b00t+T
which is further bounded below from
¡(1¡ ±¸d)
µ
±
1¡ ±¸d
¶T
b00t+T
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because of d ¸ rt+i, i ¸ 1. Since T can be arbitrary, b00t+T · wt+T < +1, and
± < 1¡ ±¸d, this converges to zero by taking T !1. Thus the right hand side of (D8)
must converge to zero but its left hand side is strictly negative because of bt > 0, which
is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Next we consider how the opportunity of bequest transfer a®ects the choice of
the optimal relational contracts in equilibrium. When a young R-producer receives a
bequest bpt¡1 from his parent in period t ¡ 1, he can use this to invest zt in capital.
When a young R-lender receives a bequest blt¡1 from her parent in period t ¡ 1, she
will have the total fund wt¡1+ blt¡1 which will be invested in capital investment for the
R-producer matching her.
We denote by V pt and V
l
t the pro¯ts of a R-producer and a R-lender without repay-
ment Rt and bequest transfer bit, i = p; l, leaving to their children respectively.
There are three possible cases which may occur in equilibrium.
Case (1). bpt¡1 ¸ zt. Then a R-producer invests zt in capital by himself and saves
the remaining amount bpt¡1 ¡ zt. Then we have V pt = ptzt + ¸rt(bpt¡1 ¡ zt) and V lt =
¸rt(wt¡1 + blt¡1).
Case (2). zt > b
p
t¡1. There are two sub-cases:
Case (2-1). wt¡1+bt¡1 ¸ zt where bt¡1 ´ bpt¡1+blt¡1. In this case a young R-producer
borrows zt ¡ bpt¡1 from the R-lender matching him for capital investment zt. Then we
have V pt = ptzt and V
l
t = ¸rt(wt¡1 + bt¡1 ¡ zt).
Case (2-2). zt > wt¡1 + bt¡1. Then the R-producer needs to borrow zt ¡ wt¡1 ¡ bt¡1
from the credit market after receiving wt¡1+ blt¡1 from the R-lender and using his own
fund bpt¡1. Thus we have V
p
t = ptzt + rt(wt¡1 + bt¡1 ¡ zt) and V lt = 0.
Thus the incentive compatibility condition for an old R-producer becomes
V pt ¡Rt ¡ bpt + ±fV pt+1 ¡Rt+1 ¡ bpt+1g ¸ V pt ¡ b^pt + ±¼(xt+1; b^pt+1jb^pt ) (BICt)
where b^pt denotes the bequest transfer of an old R-producer after quitting from the
relationship and engaging in arm's length contracts, and ¼(xt+1; b^
p
t+1jb^pt ) denotes the
pro¯t of an A-producer (de¯ned by (D1)). The individual rationality constraint for a
young R-lender becomes
V lt +Rt¡ blt+ ±fV lt+1+Rt+1¡ blt+1g ¸ ¸rt(wt¡1+ blt¡1)¡ b^lt+ ±f¸rt+1(wt+ b^lt)¡ b^lt+1g
(BIRLt)
where b^lt denotes the bequest transfer of a R-lender after quitting relationship. Thus,
by combining these conditions together, we have the modi¯ed incentive compatibility
condition:
¡ bt + V lt + ±fJt+1 ¡ bt+1 ¡ ¼(xt+1; b^pt+1jb^pt )¡ [¸rt+1(wt + b^pt )¡ b^lt+1]g
¸ ¸rt(wt¡1 + blt¡1)¡ b^t (BIC¤t )
where bt ´ bpt + blt and b^t ´ b^pt + b^lt and Jt+1 ´ V pt+1 + V lt+1.
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Also the individual rationality constraint for a young R-producer is
V pt ¡Rt ¡ bpt + ±fV pt+1 ¡Rt+1 ¡ bpt+1g ¸ ¼(xt; b^pt jbpt¡1) + ±¼(xt+1; b^pt+1jb^pt ) (BIRPt)
By combining BIRLt with BIRPt, we obtain the net total surplus condition:
Jt ¡ bt + ±fJt+1 ¡ bt+1g ¸ ¼(xt; b^pt jbpt¡1) + ±¼(xt+1; b^pt+1jb^pt )
+ ¸rt(wt¡1 + blt¡1)¡ b^lt + ±f¸rt+1(wt + b^lt)¡ b^lt+1g (BTSt)
Let Vt ´ Jt ¡ bt + ±fJt+1 ¡ bt+1g denote the joint payo® of a young R-producer
and a young R-lender born in period t ¡ 1. Then, each relationship pair chooses a
sequence fzt; bpt ; bltg1t=0 in order to maximize the weighted sum of the joint payo®sP1
t=0 ¯
tVt = J0 ¡ b0 + (± + ¯)
P1
t=1 ¯
t¡1(Jt ¡ bt) subject to BIC¤t and BTSt¡1 for
t = 1; 2; :::
We ¯rst show the following lemma.
Lemma D1. In any equilibrium path zt · ^¸xt holds in any period t.
Proof. We consider the equilibrium choice of zt. If above Case (1) is applied to
the equilibrium choice of zt in period t, then zt does not a®ect BIC¤t . zt a®ects only
the left hand sides of BIC¤t¡1, BTSt and BTSt¡1 through the term Jt. Since Jt =
ptzt + ¸rt(wt¡1 + bt¡1 ¡ zt) in Case (1), zt must maximize Jt subject to bpt ¸ zt. Thus
zt · ^¸xt must be satis¯ed. If Case (2-1) is applied to zt, then zt a®ects the left hand
side of BIC¤t through the term ¸rtzt as well as the left hand sides of BICt¡1, BTSt and
BTSt¡1 through the term Jt. Since Jt = ptzt + ¸rt(wt¡1 + bt¡1 ¡ zt) in Case (2-1),
the equilibrium choice of zt must maximize Jt subject to BIC¤t . Thus zt · ^¸xt must
be satis¯ed as well. Finally, if Case (2-2) is applied to zt, then zt a®ects only BTSt,
BTSt¡1 and BIC¤t¡1 through the term Jt. Thus, since Jt = ptzt + rt(wt¡1 + bt¡1 ¡ zt)
in Case (2-2), zt must maximize Jt in equilibrium, resulting in zt = xt < ^¸xt.
Thus we have established that zt · ^¸xt in any period t. Q.E.D.
We then show the following lemma.
Lemma D2. Let ~x be de¯ned as
~x ´
Ã
¸(1¡ ®)A(1¡ l)
l^¸ + (1¡ l)
!1=(1¡®)
:
Then, it must be that rt · d ´ ®2A[minf~x; x0g]®¡1 in any period t in any equilibrium
path.
Proof. There are three distinct cases of the credit market equilibrium depending on
whether or not each producer invests more than what he owns.
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Case (i): wt¡1 + bt¡1 ¸ zt and xt > b^pt¡1. In this case the credit market equilibrium
becomes
¸l(wt¡1 + bt¡1 ¡ zt) + ¸(1¡ l)(wt¡1 + b^lt¡1) = (1¡ l)(xt ¡ b^pt¡1)
which implies that ¸wt¡1 · ¸lzt + (1 ¡ l)xt · (¸l^¸ + (1 ¡ l))xt due to Lemma D1
(zt · ^¸xt).
Note that both wt¡1+bt¡1 ¸ zt and xt · b^pt¡1 are never compatible with each other
in the credit market equilibrium.33 Thus, the remaining cases are the following:
Case (ii): zt > wt¡1 + bt¡1 and xt > b^
p
t¡1. In this case the credit market equilibrium
becomes
¸(1¡ l)(wt¡1 + b^pt¡1) = l(zt ¡ wt¡1 ¡ bt¡1) + (1¡ l)(xt ¡ b^pt¡1)
which implies that (¸(1¡ l) + (1¡ l))wt¡1 · (l^¸ + (1¡ l))xt.
Case (iii): zt > wt¡1 + bt¡1 and xt · b^pt¡1. In this case the credit market equilibrium
becomes
¸(1¡ l)(wt¡1 + b^lt¡1) + ¸(1¡ l)(b^pt¡1 ¡ xt) = l(zt ¡ wt¡1 ¡ bt¡1)
which implies that (¸(1¡ l) + l)wt¡1 · (l^¸ + (1¡ l)¸)xt.
By Case (i)-(iii) above, it must be that ¸wt¡1 · (l^¸ +(1¡ l))xt which together with
LMEt implies that ¸(1¡®)A(1¡ l)x®t¡1 · (l^¸ + (1¡ l))xt. Thus xt ¸ minf~x; x0g must
be satis¯ed. Since rt = ®2Ax®¡1t , we conclude that rt · d in any period t. Q.E.D.
In what follows we ¯x ± such that ± < 1=(1 + d) for d being de¯ned in Lemma
D2. Then we show that introducing bequest transfer never expands the set of incentive
compatible relational contracts under the following condition.
Assumption D1. minfx0; ~xg ¸ (1=(1¡ ®))1=®(±®2A)1=(1¡®).
In particular, we show that under Assumption D1, the equilibrium relational con-
tract which maximizes the weighted sum of expected payo®s of all the generations in
each dynasty uses no bequest transfers at all. Recall that
P1
t=0 ¯
tVt is the weighted
sum of joint payo®s of generations in a dynasty where
P1
t=0 ¯
tVt = J0 ¡ b0 + (± +
¯)
P1
t=1 ¯
t¡1Jt.
Proposition D4. Suppose that ¯ · ± < minf1=(1+ d); 1=d¡ ¯g and that Assumption
D1 holds. Then the optimal relational contract involves no bequest transfers at all even
when bequest transfer is allowed.
33If this is the case, credit demand is zero while credit supply is positive.
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Proof. Suppose that ± < 1=(1+d). Then Proposition D2 and D3 show that b^pt = b^
l
t = 0
in any period t. Thus, (BIC¤t ) is simpli¯ed to
¡bt + V lt + ±fJt+1 ¡ bt+1 ¡ ¼(xt+1; 0j0)¡ ¸rt+1wtg ¸ ¸rt(wt¡1 + blt¡1) (BIC¤t )
Here, we have
¡bt + ±fJt+1 ¡ bt+1 ¡ ¼(xt+1; 0j0)¡ ¸rt+1wtg ¸ 0 (BIC¤t in Case (1))
¡bt + ±fJt+1 ¡ bt+1 ¡ ¼(xt+1; 0j0)¡ ¸rt+1wtg ¸ ¸rt(zt ¡ bpt¡1) (BIC¤t in Case (2-1))
¡bt+ ±fJt+1¡ bt+1¡¼(xt+1; 0j0)¡¸rt+1wtg ¸ ¸rt(wt¡1+ blt¡1) (BIC¤t in Case (2-2))
Next we show that BTSt for t ¸ 1 is implied by other constraints in any period
t ¸ 1. First note that BIC¤t¡1 implies that Jt ¡ bt ¸ ¼(xt; 0j0) + ¸rtwt. Also we can
show the following claim:
Claim 1. The choice of bt ¸ 0 which maximizes ¡b+ ±¼(xt; 0jb) becomes zero (b = 0).
Proof. Recall that ¼(xt; 0jb) = ptxt¡rt(xt¡b) if xt > b and ¼(xt; 0jb) = ptxt+¸rt(b¡xt)
if b ¸ xt respectively. Here xt must be chosen in order to maximize ¼(x; 0jb) over x ¸ 0
in equilibrium due to Proposition D1. Let x(rt) be the maximizer of ptxt ¡ rtxt and
x(¸rt) be the maximizer of ptxt ¡ ¸rtxt. Then xt 2 fx(rt); b; x(¸rt)g must be satis¯ed
in any equilibrium. Thus ¼(xt; 0jb) varies with b only when x(rt) · b · x(¸rt). Since
¡1 + ±®2Ab®¡1 · ¡1 + ±rt · ¡1 + ±d < 0 over b 2 [x(rt); x(¸rt)]. Thus b = 0 is the
optimal choice to maximize ¡b+ ±¼(xt; 0jb). Q.E.D.
By using this claim, we can show that for any b0 ¸ 0 and b00 ¸ 0, ¼(xt+1; 0j0) +
¸rt+1wt ¸ ¼(xt+1; 0jb0)¡ (1=±)b0+ ¸rt+1(wt+ b00)¡ (1=±)b00 holds. Thus, ¼(xt+1; 0j0)+
¸rt+1wt ¸ ¼(xt+1; 0jbpt )¡ (1=±)bpt + ¸rt+1(wt + blt)¡ (1=±)blt. Then, BIC¤t implies that
¡bt+V lt +±fJt+1¡bt+1¡¼(xt+1; 0jbpt )¡¸rt+1(wt+blt)g ¸ ¸rt(wt¡1+blt¡1) which shows
that Jt+1¡ bt+1 ¸ ¼(xt+1; 0jbpt )+¸rt+1(wt+ blt) for all t ¸ 1. Since BIC¤t+1 also implies
that Jt+2 ¡ bt+2 ¸ ¼(xt+2; 0j0) + ¸rt+2wt+1, BTSt is satis¯ed in any period t ¸ 2.
Finally we show that BTS1 holds as well. Since J2 ¡ b2 ¸ ¼(x2; 0j0) + ¸r2w1,
BTS1 is satis¯ed if J1 ¡ b1 ¸ ¼(x1; 0jbp0) + ¸r1(w0 + bl0). To see this, consider BTS0:
J0 ¡ b0 + ±fJ1 ¡ b1g ¸ ¼0 + ±¼(x1; 0j0) + ±r1w0. Here any initial old lender has no
incomes at all and any initial old producer earns the pro¯t ¼0. Thus J0 = ¼0. Since
J0 = ¼0 ¸ b0 ¸ bp0 and ¡b + ±¼(x1; 0jb) is maximized at b = 0 again (Claim 1 above),
BTS0 implies that ¡b0+ ±fJ1¡ b1g ¸ ¡bp0+ ±¼(x1; 0jbp0)+ ±r1w0 which in turn implies
that
±fJ1 ¡ b1 ¡ ¼(x1; 0jbp0)g ¸ bl0 + ±¸r1w0
¸ ±r1bl0 + ±¸r1w0
= ±¸r1(w0 + bl0)
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because 1 > ±d ¸ ±r1. Thus J1 ¡ b1 ¸ ¼(x1; 0jbp0) + ¸r1(w0 + bl0) and BTSt is satis¯ed
for all t ¸ 1.
Thus we have established that only relevant constraint of BTSt is BTS0:
¡b0 + ±fJ1 ¡ b1g ¸ ±¼(x1; 0j0) + ±r1w0 (BTS0)
where b^p0 = 0 and J0 = ¼0.
Recall that Vt ´ Jt¡bt+±(Jt+1¡bt+1) be the joint payo® of a R-producer and a R-
lender in t-th generation. Then the equilibrium relational contract fzt; bpt ; bltg1t=0 must
maximize the weighted sum of expected payo®s of all future generations
P1
t=0 ¯
tVt =
J0 ¡ b0 + (± + ¯)
P1
t=1 ¯
t¡1(Jt ¡ bt) subject to BIC¤t , t ¸ 1, and BTS0.
First, observe that bp0 = b
l
0 = 0 must hold because ¡b0+ ±J1 is maximized at b0 = 0
due to 1 > ±d ¸ ±rt and BIC¤1 is relaxed by reduction of bl0. Since ± < 1=d¡¯ also holds
by assumption, ¡b0+ (±+ ¯)J1 is maximized at b0 = 0. Thus b0 = 0 becomes optimal.
Second, blt = 0 must be also satis¯ed for t ¸ 1. To see this, note that reduction of blt
from any positive level makes all the relevant constraints BIC¤t , BIC¤t¡1, BIC¤t+1 and
BTS0 satis¯ed because ¡blt + ±Jt+1 is increased due to 1 > ±d and rt · d. Since the
joint payo® ¡blt + ¯Jt+1 is improved by reducing blt > 0 due to 1 ¸ ¯d and d ¸ rt,
blt = 0 becomes optimal.
Finally, consider the equilibrium choice of bpt for t ¸ 1. We ¯rst show the following
claim.
Claim 2. Case (2-2) (zt > wt¡1 + bt¡1) never happens in any period t.
Proof. Suppose that Case (2-2) occurs in some period t. In this case the equilibrium
choice of zt must maximize Jt = ptzt + rt(zt ¡ wt¡1 ¡ bt¡1) because this makes all the
relevant constraints relaxed while increasing the joint payo®. Thus zt = xt must be
satis¯ed. However, then CMEt implies that ¸(1¡ l)wt¡1 = l(zt¡wt¡1¡bt¡1)+(1¡ l)xt
where b^lt¡1 = b^
p
t¡1 = 0 and hence ¸wt¡1 > xt. Thus we must have wt¡1 > xt = zt which
however contradicts to zt > wt¡1 + bt¡1. Q.E.D.
Case (2-1) is only the case that bpt > 0 may happen in equilibrium because b
p
t > 0
relaxes BIC¤t in Case (2-1). Now, we use the change of variable ~zt+1 ´ zt+1 ¡ bpt .
Then, note that bpt a®ects only ¡bpt + ±Jt+1 in all the relevant constraints through
the term pt+1(b
p
t + ~zt+1). If Case (1) or (2-1) is applied to period t + 1, then Jt+1 =
pt+1(b
p
t+~zt+1)+¸rt+1(wt¡~zt+1). Since maximizing ¡bpt+±Jt+1 and choosing bpt = 0 can
relax all the relevant constraints while maximizing ¡bpt + ¯Jt+1 improves the objective
function, it su±ces to show that bpt = 0 maximizes ¡bpt +±Jt+1 and ¡bpt +¯Jt+1. Taking
the ¯rst order derivative of the former, we obtain ¡1 + ±®2A(bpt + ~zt+1)®¡1. If this is
positive for some period t+ 1, we have ~zt+1 + b
p
t < (±®
2A)1=(1¡®). Then we obtain
pt+1(~zt+1 + b
p
t )¡ ¼t+1
· ®A(±®2A)®=(1¡®) ¡ (1¡ ®)®Ax®t+1
· 0
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because xt+1 ¸ (1=(1 ¡ ®))1=®(±®2A)1=(1¡®) which holds due to Assumption D1 and
the fact that xt ¸ minfx0; ~xg for all t ¸ 1. However, then the net total surplus
Jt+1 ¡ bt+1 ¡ ¼t+1 ¡ ¸rt+1wt becomes strictly negative so that BIC¤t never holds, a
contradiction. Thus bpt = 0 which maximizes ¡bpt+±Jt+1 must be satis¯ed in any period
t in any equilibrium. Also, since ¯ · ± as we assumed, ¡bpt + ¯Jt+1 is maximized at
bpt = 0. Thus, the equilibrium relational contract must involve b
p
t = 0 for all t ¸ 1 as
well. Q.E.D.
Finally we make the remark on the conditions we have so far made above: ¯ ·
± < 1=(1 + d), ± + ¯ < 1=d and Assumption D1. We show that there is an open set of
the parameter values for which these conditions hold together with Assumption 1 and
2 made in the main text. To see this, assume that x0 is small so that x0 < ~x. Then
d = ®2Ax®¡10 . Then Assumption D1 is equivalent to ± · (1 ¡ ®)(1¡®)=®=d. Since d is
independent of ¸ and l, Assumption 2 can be consistent with ± < 1=(1+d), ±+¯ < 1=d,
¯ · ± and Assumption D1 if ¸ and l are both small. Assumption 1 also holds when x0
is small.
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